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Common, Public, and Private Things in
Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern
Practice
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
In the Civil Code of Louisiana,' things are classified into
several categories, according to a number of criteria.2 An important classification is made in Article 481 of the Code which
declares that "Things, in their relation to those who possess or
enjoy them, are divided into two classes; those which are not
susceptible of ownership and those which are."'3 Several articles
in the Code refer to things which belong to one or the other
category.4 In that regard, Article 449 is of particular importance. This article provides that "Things are either common or
public. Things susceptible of ownership belong to corporations,
or they are the property of individuals." 5 While, perhaps, "senseless as it is written," Article 449 becomes meaningful in the
light of Article 481: it establishes the distinction of things into
common, public, and private, and indicates which of those things
are susceptible of ownership and which are not.7
The distinction of things according to their susceptibility or
insusceptibility of ownership has its origin in Roman texts. 8 Con*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. In this study, the words Code, Civil Code, and Louisiana Civil Code refer
always to the Louisiana Revised Civil Code of 1870.
2. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 449, 453, 459-461, 481 (1870). For classifications
in other civil law systems, see BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 489
et seq. (1955) (in Greek) ; 1 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDItRE,
TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 819 (1953); I 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, LEuRBUCH DE
B ROERLICHEN RECHTS 503 (1949); LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES B1IRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCIIES 357 (1957); 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP, PRATIQUE DE

DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 59 (1952).
3. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE (1808)

(no corresponding article) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art.

473 (1825).
4. See e.g. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 450-459, 482-486 (1870).
5. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE p. 94, art. 2 (1808) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art, 440 (1825).
6. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 146 (1925).
7. Article 449 should, actually, read: "Things [which are not susceptible of
ownership] are either common or public. Things susceptible of ownership belong
to corporations or they are the property of individuals."
8. This distinction, originally made by Gaius, was taken over in the Institutes
of Justinian. See GAIUS, INSTITUTES 2.1; JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1 De R.D.
pr.: "Vel in nostro patrimonio sunt, vel extra nostrum patrimonium habentur."
It has been said that the distinction was one of fact, namely reference was made

to things presently "owned."

However, it can easily be regarded as one of law,
[697]

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

temporary continental doctrine, however, and modern codes,
generally, have abandoned this distinction in favor of another,
analytically preferable, between things "in commerce" and
things "out of commerce."0 This last distinction, which is not
without historical foundation, 10 is based on the realistic consideration that, while all things are by their nature susceptible of
ownership, certain things may be withdrawn, entirely or in part,
from the sphere of free private relations due to controlling considerations of public utility and convenience. Thus, ordinarily,
things "in commerce" are all things which the law has not placed
"out of commerce." Things out of commerce are, ordinarily,
common things, things dedicated to public use, and things serving a public purpose."
In Louisiana, the Civil Code, subsequent statutory legislation,
and a body of jurisprudence adhere to the distinction of things
according to their susceptibility of ownership. Though perhaps
analytically deficient, the traditional classification will be adopted in the following discussion. Accordingly, the categories of
common, public, and private things will be dealt with as instances within the broader categories of things susceptible of
ownership and things not so susceptible.
THINGS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF OWNERSHIP
Things "not susceptible of ownership" are divided by the
Code into two categories: those which by their nature "can never
become the object of it; as things in common of which all men
have the enjoyment and use" (Article 482, paragraph 1) and
those which "though naturally susceptible of ownership, may
lose this quality" as having been dedicated to some public use,
incompatible with private ownership, such as streets, highways,
namely as a distinction between things susceptible of ownership and things not so
susceptible. See GIRARD, MANTEL t]LkMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 251 n.1 (1924).
9. See ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, I 1 LEHRBucH DES Bt RGERLICHEN RECHTS

544 (1949) ; BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 525 (1955)
Cf. PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT

(in Greek).

PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 700 (1952).

See also GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 966-970. Cf. FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 537. The
German Civil Code and the Swiss Civil Code have not included corresponding provisions. It was thought that things out of commerce should be regulated exclusively
by rules of public law which had no place in a Civil Code. See LEHMANN, ALLOEMEINER TElL DES BRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 368 (1957).

10. See, e.g., DIGEST 20.3.1.2.
DES R6MISCHEN

RECHTS

253

Cf. SOHM-MITTEIS-WENOsn,

(1923);

WEISS,

INSTITUTIONEN

INSTITUTIONEN DES R6IMISCHEN

PRIVATRECHTS 129 (1949).
11. See, e.g., GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 966: "Things outside of commerce are
those common to all, those subject to public use and those dedicated to serve pub-

lic, municipal, communal, or religious purposes."
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and public places (Article 482, paragraph 2).12 The distinction
is important because things of the second category, as soon as
they cease being applied to that purpose, resume the quality of
being susceptible of ownership (Article 482, paragraph 2), while
things of the first category will remain forever insusceptible of

private ownership. 18
The interpretation of Article 482 and the classification of a
number of things under one or the other of the two categories

it establishes have been controversial matters in Louisiana."4
Perhaps this article, as many others in the Code, can be best
understood in the light of Roman sources. Things not susceptible of ownership in Roman law were distinguished into
common things, 15 public things,' and things of Divine law.17 The
last category is expressly abolished in the Louisiana Civil Code;
such things today are susceptible of private ownership.'8 Thus
it seems that Article 482, paragraph 1, refers to common things
and Article 482, paragraph 2 to public things, or, more accurately, to things subject to public use.
COMMON THINGS

Common things are defined by the Code as "those the ownership of which belongs to nobody in particular, and which all men
may freely use, conformably with the use for which nature has
intended them; such as air, running water, the sea and its
shores" (Article 450).11) This provision reproduces a passage in
the Institutes of Justinian, 20 based on the questionable assump12. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE (1808) (no corresponding article) ; LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 473 (1825).
13. It should be noted in this connection that such things are insusceptille
of private ownership merely because the Code so provides. Thus, unless there is
a constitutional prohibition, any other statute may establish exceptions, and even
abolish the rule of the Code. Cf. argument by Edward Livingston in Renthorp v.
Bourg, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 97, 98 (La. 1816) ; text at notes 78-80, 118 infra; Comment,
12 TuL. L. REV. 428, 438 (1938).
14. See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954) ; text at note
121 infra.
15. Common things in Roman law (res omnium communes) were things regarded as insusceptible of private ownership by their nature. See GIRARD, MANUEL
fL]kMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 251-55 (1924) ; WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES R5MISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 129-32 (1949) ; text at note 21 infra.
16. Public things in Roman law (res publicae) were, in general, state property
serving public purposes. See SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN RECHTS 253-55 (1923) ; text at note 66 infra.
17. Things of Divine law (res diuini furis) in Roman law were the res sacrae
(sacred or holy things), res sanctae ("sanctioned" things), and res religiosaa (religious things). See GAiUs, INSTITUTES 2.2-11.
18. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 456 (1870).
19. Of. LA. CIvIL CODE, p. 94, art. 3 (1808) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 441 (1825).
20. See JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1.1: "Et Quidem naturali jure communia
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tion that common things are insusceptible of private ownership
by their very nature.2 1 This approach has been abandoned in
modern civil codes as it became clear that insusceptibility of private ownership is merely a matter of legal prohibition and not
an inherent characteristic of the things concerned. Thus, in the
German z2 Civil Code there is no reference to common things; in
the French Civil Code 28 there is merely an allusion; and in the
Greek Civil Code, 24 where the traditional classification is retained, the category of common things has only academic significance.
In Louisiana, in accordance with the desire of the state to
secure greater administrative and financial advantages, a number of statutes were enacted which asserted state ownership over
things regarded by the Code as common. 25 This legislation resulted, on the one hand, in a near elimination of the category of
common things, and, on the other hand, in substantial additions
to the category of public things.2 6 The reclassification thus
brought into line Louisiana law and modern continental doctrine.
To what extent the scheme of the Code has been altered will become apparent in the following discussion of things originally
regarded as common.
aunt omnium haec: aer et acqua profluens et mare et per hoc litora maria. Nemo
igitur ad litus maris accedere prohibetur, dum temen villis et monumentia et aedifiCii8 ab8tineat, quia non aunt juris gentium sicut et mare. Flumina autem omnia
et portu8 publica aunt, ideoque jus piacandl omnibus commune eat in portibua fluminibusque."
21. See note 20 supra. Cf. SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES RMISCHEN RECHTS 255 (1923). The designation res omnium communes seems to be
post-classical. Originally, such things were regarded either as rea publicae or as
res nullius. See WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 132
(1949).
22. See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtYRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 368
(1957).
23. Cf. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 714: "There are things which belong to nobody
and the use of which is common to all. Police regulations govern the mode of their
enjoyment." The seashore, and running waters, are parts of the public domain
of the state. See FRENCI CIVIL CODE art. 538.
24. See, e.g., GREEK CIVIL CODE, art. 966, note 11 supra. Under the Greek
Civil Code, "common" things are only the air and, perhaps, the open sea. See
BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 527 (1955) (in Greek). Running
water and the seashore are classified as things of public use. See GREEK CIVIL
CODE art. 967: "Things of public use are, particularly, freely and perpetually
running water, roads, public squares, the seashore, harbors and roadsteads, the
banks of navigable rivers, large lakes and their shores."
25. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 9:1101 (1950) (declaring that the waters of all bayous,
lagoons, lakes, and bays are owned by the state. Cf. text at notes 35, 104 infra) ;
LA. R.S. 49:3 (1950) (declaring that the portion of the Gulf of Mexico within
Louisiana boundaries is owned by the state. Cf. text at note 59 infra).
26. See Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership 8, in WEST'S LOUISIANA

CIVIL CODE preceding Art. 448 (1950).
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Air
Only air, among the four things enumerated in Article 450 of
the Louisiana Civil Code as common, has not been the subject of
legislative reclassification. According to the Code air in its entirety is not susceptible of private ownership; anyone interested,
however, may reduce finite quantities of air into possession and
27
ownership.
The question has been posed in the past whether Article 450
refers merely to "air" as a mixture of several chemical compounds or also to the airspace above the surface of the soil.28 In
contrast to what has been suggested by certain civilian writers
elsewhere, 29 it is clear in Louisiana that airspace is not a common
thing. According to Article 505 of the Code, airspace belongs to
the owner of the soil over which it extends.30 Though a private
thing, however, airspace may be freely used for aerial traffic in
3
reasonable altitudes. '
Running Water
Following Roman sources, the Civil Code of Louisiana in32
cludes "running water" in the category of common things.
Under the Code, "running water" is apparently distinguishable
from the space it occupies and from the bed which contains it;
while the water belongs to "nobody in particular," the bed may
belong to the state or to private persons.
According to modern continental conceptions, running water
should be regarded by the law as conceptually inseparable from
its bed. 33 This means that running water should belong to the
owner of the bed, be it the state or private persons. However,
while regarded as a private or a public thing as the case might
27. Cf. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 147 (1926).
28. See Comment, Ownership of Airspace in Louisiana, 8 LOUISIANA LAw
REVIEW 118 (1947).
29. See 2 VALVERDE, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL ESPANOL 79-81 (1925) (advancing the argument that airspace is a common thing).
30. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 505 (1870); Comment, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 118 (1947). Article 505 of the Louisiana Civil Code is almost identical with
Article 552 of the French Civil Code. For contemporary doctrine in France, see
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 251 (1952).
31. It should be noted, however, that as yet the issue has not been presented
to Louisiana courts. For possible solutions on the basis of a comparative study,
see Comment, 8 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW 118, 127 (1947).
32. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 450 (1870). Cf. text at note 20 supra.
33. See BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 528, 532 (1955) (in
Greek). Cf. D.43.12.1.7: "Impossibile est, ut alveus fluminis publici non Bit publicus."
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be, "running water" in modern
codes is placed in the category
84
of things subject to public use.
In Louisiana, legislative and judicial action resulted, contrary
to Article 450 of the Civil Code, in the recognition that several
bodies of running water are owned by the state rather than "nobody in particular." This re-classification did not affect adversely the public use of waters.3 5 Legislation and jurisprudence
simply stress public interest and require that the user of running

waters should consider the rights of other persons, particularly
with regard to pollution.3 6
Sea

In the light of actuality, "sea" in Article 450 of the Louisiana Civil Code can have no meaning other than the Gulf of Mexico. However, though "sea" (meaning the Gulf) has been classified as a "common" thing in the Code, subsequent statutory
legislation asserted state ownership of the Gulf and of adjacent
bodies of water.3 7 As a result, the "sea" must be regarded today
as a "public" rather than a "common" thing.
34. See, e.g., GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 967 (public use); FRENCH CIVIL CODE
art. 538 (public domain).
35. Cf. LA. R.S. 9:1101 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 443, p. 834:
"The waters of and in all bayous, rivers, streams, lagoons, lakes, and bays . . .
not under the direct ownership of any person on August 12, 1910, are declared
to be the property of the State. There shall never be any charge assessed for the
use of the waters of the State for municipal, industrial, agricultural, or domestic
purposes."
The statute, drafted in broad terms, creates the implication that running waters
could have been owned privately prior to August 12, 1910. Yet, under Article 450
of the Civil Code, running water is insusceptible of private ownership and could
not have been owned privately by anyone at any time. Actually, the two texts
can be reconciled on the ground that the statute intended to respect private rights
acquired prior to August 12, 1910, on bodies of water other than bodies of running
water.
36. See Long v. Louisiana Creosoting Co., 137 La. 861, 69 So. 281 (1915)
LA. R.S. 14:58; 38:216; 56:362; 56:1431; 56:1451 (1950). In addition, irrigation districts (LA. R.S. 38:2101 (1950)), the Sabine River Authority (id.
38:2321 et seq.), and the Southwest Water Conservation District (id. 38:2501
et seq.), are given authority to control water usage in designated areas. Of. Comment, Water Rights in Louisiana, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 500, 509 (1956)
Comment, Acquisition of the Right to Use Water, 29 TuL. L. REV. 554 (1955).
37. See LA. R.S. 49:3, 56:421 (1950). Louisiana courts have indicated that
the words "sea and its shore" in Article 450 of the Code refer to the water of the
sea rather than the sea bottom. Thus, while under the Code sea-water is a "common" thing, the bottom is not. See Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 741, 117 So.
812, 813 (1928), holding that Article 450 does not "even impliedly, include the
beds of any waters." See also Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission,
125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910) ; California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 734, 74
So. 2d 1, 11 (1954). In recent years, combined legislative and judicial action
resulted in the recognition of private interests in the bottom of the Gulf. See text
at note 121 infra.
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The peculiar geological and geographical conditions prevailing in the Louisiana coast, with thousands of acres of marsh land
and the beds of innumerable bayous, bays, and inlets, make it difficult to determine what is "sea." Due to the growth of oyster
industries, the discovery of oil along the Gulf Coast, and the
value of these waters as fishing areas, the significance of this
determination is not merely academic. If such waters are "sea,"t
whether navigable or not, they are subject to public use (whether
as "common" things under the Code or as "public" under subsequent statutes) and, in principle, not susceptible of private ownership. If on the other hand, such areas are inland non-navigable
waters, then they are not subject to public use and private ownership is possible. 8
The courts of Louisiana have regarded as "sea" bodies of
water known as "arms of the sea." What is an arm of the sea
has been decided in a number of cases. In general, a body of
water will be regarded as an arm of the sea if it is located in the
immediate vicinity of the open coast and is overflowed by the
tides directly. Thus, in the leading case of Morgan v. Negodich,9
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a bayou which joined a
bay on the open coast with a bay further inland was not an arm
of the sea. Although its waters were a mixture of salt water
from the Gulf and fresh water from the Mississippi, the bayou
was not located in the immediate vicinity of the coast and was
not overflowed by the tides directly; the salt water first entered
an arm of the Gulf and thence flowed into the bayou. The same
test was applied in the case of Buras v. Salinovich.40 It was held
in that case that a body of water subject to tidal overflow is not
merely for this reason an arm of the sea; the term applies only
to tidal waters in lakes, bays, and sounds along the open coast.
Special rules, however, apply to Lake Pontchartrain. Though
not in the vicinity of the open coast, and not affected by the
tides, Lake Pontchartrain has been consistently regarded as an
41
arm of the sea.

38. See Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 125 La. 740, 51 So.
706 (1910) ; Comment, Seashore in Louisiana, 8 TuL. L. REV. 272, 273 (1934);
text at notes 103, 116, 140 infra.
39. 40 La. Ann. 246, 3 So. 636 (1888).
40. 154 La. 495, 97 So. 748 (1923).
41. See Bruning v. New Orleans, 165 La. 511, 115 So. 733 (1928) ; Burns v.
Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906). See also New
Orleans Land Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 171
La. 718, 132 So. 121 (1931) ; Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837
(1882) ; Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838).
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The determination whether a body of water is an arm of the
sea or an inland fresh water lake was in the past important in
the light of the rules governing alluvion and erosion. 42 While it
was settled that both newly formed and submerged lands in an
arm of the sea, whether navigable or not, belonged to the state,4
it was by no means certain that the same rule applied to inland
navigable waters other than rivers; and, at least prior to the
enactment of Act 258 of 1910, the assumption was that, in contrast to arms of the sea, additions to lands at the shore of inland
non-navigable waters belonged to the riparian landowner and his
title to submerged lands was not lost. 44 Today, however, it is

clear that the rules on alluvion additions do not apply to any
state-owned waters other than rivers, whether regarded as arms
of the sea or inland navigable or non-navigable waters. 45 Further, the same rules apply as to both arms of the sea and inland
navigable waters with regard to eroded lands. 46 Thus, the determination whether a body of water is an arm of the sea or not
may be important today only in connection with eroded lands
and a finding that the water in question is an inland non-navigable body of water. In such a case, presumably, title is not lost
for the private owner.
The matter of the classification of the sea has been further
complicated by federal case and statutory law. Contrary to the
long-held view that coastal states possessed all the incidents of
ownership in off-shore land, the United States Supreme Court
declared in a series of decisions that off-shore land beneath the
waters is subject to federal "paramount rights. ' 4T It is by no
42. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 509, 510 (1870). Cf. text at notes 98, 124 et
seq. infra.
43. These principles may be illustrated with cases concerning Lake Pontchartrain. In Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882), it was held
that the rules on alluvion and dereliction had no application since Lake Pontchartrain was an arm of the sea rather than an inland lake. And in several other
cases it was held that land eroded by the waters of Lake Pontchartrain became
insusceptible of private ownership and the property of the state. See New Orleans
Land Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 171 La. 718, 132 So. 121 (1931)
notes 131-134 infra.
44. Of. text at note 144 infra.
45. Cf. text at notes 101, 123, 132 infra.
46. See Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937) : "It appears
to be the rule that where the forces of nature - subsidence and erosion - have
operated on the banks of a navigable body of water, regardless of whether it be a
body of fresh water or the sea, or an arm of the sea, the submerged area becomes
a portion of the bed and is insusceptible of private ownership."
47. See United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); id., 340 U.S. 899
(1950) ; United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950) ; id., 340 U.S. 900 (1950) ;
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). See also Comment, 8 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 578 (1948).
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means clear what the term means in the framework of either
common law or civilian concepts, although it obviously includes
incidents of both sovereignty and ownership.
Following these decisions, Congress enacted the Submerged
Lands Act.48 The act granted to the coastal states "title to and
ownership of" valuable off-shore lands, the area to be determined
by the boundary of each state at the time of its admission to the
Union or by a boundary thereafter approved by Congress. The
statutory route was necessary to enable the states to continue
deriving economic benefits from these lands. The constitution50
ality of the act was upheld, 49 and in United States v. Louisiana,
the boundary for Louisiana was fixed at three statute miles from
the shore.
Thus, the legal situation of the Gulf today appears to be as
follows. Submerged lands up to three statute miles from the
coast line, 51 within Louisiana boundaries, belong to the State of
Louisiana, while submerged lands beyond this three-mile zone
seaward belong to the United States. However, as it is not
always clear what is the coast line in Louisiana (which should
furnish the points of departure for the measurement of the three
mile zone), cases involving disputed ownership between state and
federal governments may arise. 52 In any event, whether owned
by the state or by the federal government, the waters of the Gulf
are subject to public use for the purposes of navigation and
fishing.
Seashore
Seashore is defined by the Code as "that space of land, over
which the waters of the sea spread in the highest water, during
the winter season" (Article 451).1, This provision, which was
suitable for application along the coast of the Mediterranean
Sea where it originated, 54 could not apply intelligently to the
48. 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1958).
49. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
50. 363 U.S. 1 (1960). See The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv.
101 (1960).
51. "Coast line" is defined as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters." 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1958).
52. Cf. text at notes 39-43 supra. Cf. Comment, Federal Rights to Tidelands,
8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 578, 585 (1948).
53. Arts. 450-452 of the Louisiana Civil Code have their origin in DIGEST OF
THE CIVIL LAWS IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, p. 94, arts. 3-5 (1808).
Cf. LA. CIvIL CODE, arts. 441-443 (1825).
54. See JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1.3:: "Est autem litus maris, quatenus hi-
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peculiar geographic conditions prevailing along the coast of Louisiana.
Thus, while the seashore is well defined along the coast of
the Mediterranean, in Louisiana a myriad of bayous, bays, and
other waters adjoining the open Gulf make an accurate definition of the seashore almost impossible. Further, in contrast to.

the almost tideless Mediterranean, the Louisiana coast is overflowed by considerable tides, with high waters occurring in the
summer rather than in the winter season. 55 Accordingly, it has

been settled in Louisiana that seashore is that space of land that
lies between the mean low water mark and the mean
high water
17
mark. 5

What is sea has been discussed elsewhere.

The "paramount rights" of the United States have never been

extended beyond the low water mark landward, and, therefore,
the seashore has always been subject to state legislation.5 According to a number of statutes enacted by the Louisiana legislature the seashore has been declared - contrary to Article 450
of the Civil Code - to be property of the state. 59 This assertion
of state title, however, did not affect the public use of the seashore, which continues to be governed by Article 452 of the Civil
Code. 60
PUBLIC THINGS

The second category of things which, according to the Code,

are insusceptible of private ownership are the "public things." 61
berus fluctua maxirnus excurrit." Las Siete Partidasdeclare that the seashore is
"common to all living creatures of this world" [3.28.3], and define it as "that
space of ground covered by the waters of the sea, in their highest annual swells,
whether in winter or summer" [3.28.4]. The French and Spanish Civil Codes declare that the seashore is part of the public domain and not a common thing. See
FRENon CIVIL CODE art. 538; SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 339(1). According to the
GREEK CIVIL CODE, art. 967 the seashore is susceptible of private ownership,
though subject to public use.
55. See Comment, 8 TUL. L. REV. 272, 274 (1934). For difficulties encountered in France in connection with the definition of seashore, see 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAiTt PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS 135 (1952).
56. See Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership 11, in WEST's LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE, preceding Art. 448 (1950). The same rule applies in the definition
of "banks" of navigable rivers. Of. text at note 93 inra.
57. See text at notes 39-44 supra. See also Comment, 8 TuL. L. REV. 272, 275
(1934).
58. Of. text at note 51 supra. See also Comment, 8 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW
578, 585, 586 (1948).
59. See LA. R.S. 9:1101, 49:3, 56:421 (1950). However, parts of the bottom
of the Gulf and its shore may be 'privately owned. See text at note 119 infra.
60. Of. Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership 11, in WEST'S LOUISIANA
CIVL CODE, preceding Art. 448 (1950) ; text at note 215 infra.
61. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 449, 482 (1870). Several Louisiana cases have
implied in the past that "public" things are inherently insusceptible of private
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Such are "those, the property of which is vested in a whole nation, and the use of which is allowed to all members of the nation" (Article 453, paragraph 1). The Code further indicates
that "of this kind are navigable rivers, seaports, roadsteads and
harbors, highways, and the beds of rivers, as long as the same
are covered with water" (Article 453, paragraph 1).62 The following Article 454 adds to the list of public things those "which
are for the common use of a city or other place, as streets and
public squares."68 The enumeration, obviously,
was intended to
64
be merely indicative rather than exclusive.
These articles, as many others in the Code, can be best understood in the light of Roman sources. In early Roman law, "public things" (res publicae) constituted one of the categories of
things not susceptible of patrimonial rights (res extra nostrum
patrimonium). Public things were property of the Roman people and their use was free to all citizens. The incidents of public
ownership were regulated by rules of law other than those of the
civil law.6 5 In the Justinian legislation, the term res publicae
does not have a well-defined meaning. The term applied to public property which was insusceptible of private ownership as
serving a public purpose ;66 the term also applied to property (of
the state or its political subdivisions) which was susceptible of
private ownership and subject to the rules of civil law like any
other property held by private persons) ;67 and, finally, the term
applied to things which were "public" only in a technical sense,
ownership. See Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936) ; State v.
Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916); Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324
(1838) ; Roussel v. Grant, 14 Orl. App. 57 (La. App. 1916). In recent years, the
realistic notion has prevailed that "public" things are insusceptible of private
ownership merely as a result of code, statutory, or constitutional provisions. See
California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954). Of. note 14 supra; text
at notes 78-80, 118 infra.
62. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE, p. 94, art. 6 (1808); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 444 (1825).
63. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE p. 94, art. 7 (1808); LA. CIvIL CODE art. 445 (1825).
64. Subsequent legislation and court action extending the category of things
subject to public use to include parks (Town of Vinton v. Lyons, 131 La. 673,
60 So. 54 (1912) ; Town of Kenner v. Zito, 13 Orl. App. 465 (La. App. 1916)),
cemeteries (Collins v. Zander, 61 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1952)), and open space
(Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870)), are thus compatible with Article 453 of the Civil Code.
65. See SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER,

(1923).

INSTITUTIONEN DES

R6MISCHEN RECHTS 253

ULPIAN D.50.16.15: "Sola enin ea publica aunt, quae populi Romani

aunt."

66. Ibid. See also WEIss, INSTITUTIONEN DES n6MISCHEN PRIVATREOHRTS 181

(1949).
67. "Res fisci, res in patrimonio universitati." i. PAPINIAN D.18.1.72.1: "Si
rea non in use publico, sed in patrimonio fiaci erit, venditio eius valebit." See also
BUcKiAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN LAW 107 (1939); WEISS, INSTITTIONEN DES
ROMISCHEN PWIVATRECHTS 131 (1949).
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as destined to public use. 68 Title to these things was not neces-

sarily vested in the state, though in that regard the sources are
in conflict. 69 It is "public things" of the last class that Articles
453 and 454 of the Louisiana Civil Code enumerate, and Article
453 defines.
The definition of "public things" in Article 453 of the Louisiana Civil Code may be subject to objections. Indeed, this definition unites two elements which civilian doctrine keeps apart,
and which are actually differentiated in subsequent articles of
the Code itself; namely state title and public use. If public things
were those "the property of which is vested in a whole nation"
(Article 453), one may wonder how "Things which are for the
common use of a city or other place, as streets and public
squares" can be "likewise public things" (Article 454). Ordinarily, title to things of the last category is vested in municipalities or even in private persons.70 Furthermore, one may wonder
how "highways" and the use of the banks of navigable rivers
are "public" (Article 453, paragraph 1), since "the soil of public roads belongs to the owner of the land on which they are
made" (Article 658) and "the ownership of the river banks belongs to those whose possess the adjacent lands" (Article 455).
It is thus apparent that the words "public things" as used in the
Code do not necessarily apply to all state property nor exclusively to things the title of which is vested in the state. In spite of
the definition in Article 453, the essential characteristic of "public things" enumerated in Articles 453 and 454 is that they are
subject to public use, rather than publicly owned. These things
may be regarded as "out of commerce," namely as insusceptible
of private relations incompatible with public use.7 1 Private title,
68. "Res publicae publico usui destinatae." Cf. D.18.1.6 pr. "in publico usu

habeantur." See also

SOIIM-MITTEIS-WENGER,

INSTITUTIONEN

DES

ROMISCHEN

REOHTs 253 (1923). It appears, therefore, that the term res publicae in the
Justinian legislation was sufficiently broad to include things both of the public
and private domain of the state. See GIRARD, MANUEL ItLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT
ROMAIN 252, n,1 (1924). But cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FBANQAIS 126 (1952), confining the term res publicae merely to things of the
last category.
69. See BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 539 (1955) (in Greek).
The text of Gaius is obscure: "Quae publicae aunt, nullius in boni8 ease creduntur;
ipsius cnim universitatis ease creduntur." (D.1.8.1. pr.). With regard to "public"
rivers in Roman law, the sources lead to the conclusion that such were public
merely quoad usum. See BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAw 212 (1921).
70. See text at note 147 et seq. infra.
71. "Public" things enumerated in Article 453 of the Civil Code are "things
which are not necessarily insusceptible of private ownership but which, because of
their nature, are committed to public use exclusively." California Co. v. Price,
225 La. 706, 733, 74 So.2d 1, 10 (1954). Cf. Tulane Educational Fund v. Board
of Assessors, 38 La. Ann. 292, 297 (1886) : "[P]roperty, dedicated to a public
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however, is possible and not necessarily incompatible with public
use. This interpretation accords with both early sources and
modern doctrine.
The use of the words "public things" to designate things
merely subject to public use is confusing and should be avoided.
Indeed, these words are used in the Code and everyday language
in a variety of meanings, and clarification of terminology is
necessary. The problem is not simply one of semantics because,
as it will be shown, different rules apply to the various categories
of things known as "public," namely things of the public domain
of the state, things of the private domain, and things subject to
public use. An accurate analysis of the Code, and the need for
consistent terminology in that regard, may necessitate much new
nomenclature. In the following analysis of the law governing
things subject to public use ("public things"), distinction will be
drawn between property belonging to the state and its political
subdivisions, and property belonging to private persons. At the
end, mention will be made of property which was originally regarded by the Code as belonging to no one in particular.
Things Subject To Public Use
State property. Property of the state, and of its political subdivisions, is distinguished according to continental civilian doctrine into property of the public domain and property of the private (or national) domain. 72 This distinction, which corresponds
to some extent to the Roman law distinction between res publicae
and res fisci,7 3 finds support in the Code though it is not spelled
out with a desirable degree of clarity. Article 453 and Article
482 of the Code actually refer to the public domain of the state.
Reference to the private domain of the state is made in Articles
485 and 486, though the word used is "national" rather than private domain. Further, such a distinction is clearly made in Aruse, the revenues of which serve a public purpose, is public property although the
title be not in the public."
72. See BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 535 (1955) (in Greek)
1 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, TRAITIP DE DROIT CIVIL 923
(1953)
1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPEREDEY, LEHRBUCH DES BaRGaRLICHEN RECHTS 547
(1949); LEIHIMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BYROERLICIEN GESETZBUCMES 368
(1957)
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 122

et

8eq.

(1952).

The distinction between the public and the private domain of the

state is actually a doctrinal construction of the middle 19th century, and it was
first clearly drawn in the celebrated treatise of PROUDHON, LA THkOIE DES
DOMAINS (1833).
Detailed discussion of the characteristics of the public domain
would exceed the scope of this study.
73. Cf. text at notes 65-67 supra.
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ticle 458 concerning property of municipalities. This article distinguishes "things which belong in common to the inhabitants of
cities and other places" into two categories: "common property,
to the use of which all inhabitants of a city or other place, and
even strangers, are entitled in common; such as streets, the public walks, and quays" (Article 458, paragraph 1), and "common
property which, though it belongs to the corporation, is not for
the common use of all the inhabitants of the place, but may be
employed for their advantage by the administrators of its revenues" (Article 458, paragraph 2). It seems that Article 458,
paragraph 1, actually refers to things belonging to the public domain, in accordance with Article 454. Article 458, paragraph 2,
on the other hand, refers to things of the private domain.
Civilian writers are not in agreement as to which things belong to the public and which to the private domain, nor as to the
criteria for the distinction. According to one line of thinking,
the essential characteristic of property within the public domain
74
is that such property is not susceptible of private ownership.
Such property is regulated by rules of public law exclusively. As
a result, to the public domain belongs all property of the state
and its political subdivisions which is outside the sphere of civil
law. 75 A somewhat different line of thinking finds the essential

characteristic of property within the public domain in dedication
to public service.76 Consequently, all property of the state and
of its political subdivisions serving a public purpose is within the
public domain. Finally, according to a third view, which apparently is the prevailing one in France, the essential characteristic
of property within the public domain is dedication to public
use.7 7 Thus, the public domain is co-extensive with property
74. See BERTHELEMY, TRAITt DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 470 (13th ed.) ; DUCBOCQ,
COURS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 104 (2d ed.) ; PROUDHON, TRAITt DU DOMAINE
Cf. DEMOLOMBE, TRAITIt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 315
PUBLIC 62-63 (1834).
For a critique of this view, see DUEz, TRAITf DE DROIT ADMINIS(1874-1882).
TRATIF 759 (1052). Cf. 3 DUoUIT, TRAITt DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 347 (1938) :
"The general distinction between public and private domain is unanimously accepted, and cannot be discarded. Frequently, the private domain is called national
domain. More frequently, it is added: the public domain is inalienable and exempt
from prescription; the private domain is alienable, subject to prescription, and
also subject to the ordinary rules governing private property."
75. See DEMOLOMBE, TRAITA DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 315 (1874-1882).
Cf. 3 DUGUIT, TRAIT]t DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 354 et 8eq. (1938). This is
obviously a formal criterion. See DUEZ, TRAITt DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 758

(1952).
76. See 3 DUGUIT,

TRAITt DE DROIT

CONSTITUTIONNEL

348, 353

(1938)

HAURIoU, PRtCIS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 617 (1921) ; Z6ze, [1921] REv. DR.
Pun. 361. This is a substantive criterion. For a critique of this view, see DUEZ,
TRAITt DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF

759 (1952).

77. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT

DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 126 (1952).
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which is subject to public use. Such property is insusceptible of
private ownership not because it is "state" property but because
it is dedicated to public use.
The classification of state property into property of the public domain and property of the private domain needs reconsideration in the light of actualities and with the view to ascertaining its usefulness. In countries like France, Germany, and
Greece, the distinction may well rest on the pragmatic consideration that property of the public domain is governed by rules of
public law and that property of the private domain does not differ at all from the property held by private individuals. 78 But

in Louisiana it would be contrary to reality to assert that any
kind of state property is essentially subject to the same rules
governing property held by private persons. All state property
in Louisiana is exempt from prescription and seizure, and if
alienation is possible, it has to be made in most instances in accordance with special procedures. 79 It seems, therefore, that in
Louisiana state property may be classified into property which
according to constitutional and statutory provisions is inalienable, and, therefore, insusceptible of private ownership and private relations in general, and property which can be alienated
and is susceptible of private ownership and private relations.80
The former may be designated as property of the public domain
For a critique of this view, see DuEz, TRAITL' DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 759
(1952). Capitant, Note D.P. [1933] 3.49 proposed abandonment of the distinction
between public and private domain and the introduction instead of the notion of
"dedication to public service." Allegedly, this notion would be sufficiently subtle
to allow accurate analysis.
78. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 127
(1952). But cf. 3 DUGUIT, TRAITA DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 348, 362 (1938) :
"The truth is that, in a general way, all state holdings are subject to special rules
which rest on completely different notions from those which are at the basis of
private property. The legal situation of certain categories of state holdings approximates, perhaps, that of property 'belonging to individuals; but it is wrong to
accept, in principle, assimilation of state holding with ownership because the two
are completely different things. . . . [A] general theory of the public domain cannot be constructed."
79. See LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 16; art. IV, § 2; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 484
(1870). Cf. New Orleans v. Salmen Brick and Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 66 So.
237 (1914). It should be also mentioned in this connection that the Louisiana
Supreme Court in cases involving title to the bottom of navigable waters adopted
common law notions according to which the state "owns" the bottom rather than
civilian conceptions of a "public domain." See text at notes 90, 106 et seq. infra.
80. A possible objection to this approach may be presented in the form of an
argument that "the cart is placed before the horse," namely, that certain things
are inalienable because they are part of the public domain. See 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITII PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 126 (1952). The advantage
of this approach, however, lies in the fact that the distinction between public and
private domain is placed on rules of positive law rather than metaphysical constructions.
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and the latter as property of the private domain. Sight should

not be lost of the fact, however, that the raison d'6tre of this distinction and attendant nomenclature is simply convenience of
understanding rather than inherent characteristics of the state
property concerned.
In the light of the foregoing, it appears that to the public

domain may belong several categories of state-owned things,
whether dedicated to public use or not.8 ' One of these categories
consists of "public things," namely things dedicated to public
use, which Article 453 of the Civil Code enumerates. Title to

these things may be vested in the state, but this title should be
regarded as one of a public law nature; and it should be regulated by rules of public law rather than the Civil Code.8 2 The
Code merely regulates, as it should, only some incidents of the
public use of such property. This property is insusceptible of

private ownership and thus exempt from seizure, prescription,
and alienation in general. 83 This category of state property dedicated to public use corresponds to the Roman law category of
res publicae publico usui destinatae. Another category of things
belonging to the public domain consists of the things which Articles 454 and 458 enumerate, namely, streets, public walks,
quays, and public squares. These things, dedicated to public use,
and out of commerce, 4 ordinarily belong to political subdivisions
of the state. The Code designates these things as "likewise pub81. According to this view, the notion of the public domain is not co-extensive
with property dedicated to public use. All property dedicated to public use, if
owned by the state, is part of the public domain. But the public domain, as it
includes all property which is inalienable, is a broader conception than state
property dedicated to public use. Thus, to the public domain belong also things
which are not subject to public use but which serve public functions in accordance
with specific regulations. This may be the case of state educational and health
institutions.
82. Several categories of state property are regulated in the Revised Statutes.
See, e.g., LA. R.S. 41:1 et seq. (1950).
83. Cf. Slattery v. Heilperin, 110 La. 86, 91, 34 So. 139 (1902) : "One takes
nothing from the public domain by the plea of prescription ;" Kline v. Parish of
Ascension, 33 La. Ann. 562 (1881) : "Property dedicated to public use cannot be
the subject of private ownership. It is out of commerce and not liable to seizure."
84. Cf. New Orleans v. Salmen Brick and Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 859, 66
So. 237, 248 (1914) : "Property, to the use of which all the inhabitants of a city,
and even strangers, are entitled in common, such as the streets, the public walks,
quays, and other public places, are not subject to private ownership; and, as prescription is one of the means of acquiring title to property, it follows that public
places cannot be acquired by prescription." See also Turfitt v. Police Jury of
Tangipahoa Parish, 191 La. 635, 186 So. 52 (1939) ("public property" such as
public squares, courthouses, and jails not subject to seizure). In Anderson v.
Thomas, 166 La. 512, 526, 117 So. 573, 579 (1928), it was held that municipal
property subject to public use "belongs to the people, i.e., to the state, and the
municipalities have only the administration thereof, unless otherwise authorized by
special laws."
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lic" (Article 454), and as "common property" or property belonging "in common" to the inhabitants of "cities and other
places" (Article 458). The corresponding notion in Roman law
is res universitatis.
Property of the private (or national) domain of the state, on
the other hand, is property susceptible of private ownership.
This notion corresponds to the res fisci of the Roman law. Such
property, though serving public purposes directly or indirectly,
is not subject to public use. It is clearly alienable by the state,
but, for reasons of policy, not subject to seizure and prescription against the state. s5 To the private domain belongs also property of political subdivisions of the state which is not destined
to public use. As in the case of similar property held by the
state itself, such property is susceptible of private ownership
and alienable but not exempt from prescription. 6 This notion
corresponds to the Roman law conception of res (publicae) in
patrimonio universitatis.
A detailed analysis of the law concerning all state property
dedicated to public use would exceed the scope of the present
study. The following discussion will be confined to the law governing navigable rivers, other navigable waters, non-navigable
waters, and highways, roads and streets.
(1) Navigable rivers. While "running water" has been classified by the Code as a "common thing," navigable rivers are
declared to be "public" (Article 453).87 Since the "beds of riv85. See LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 16.
86. See New Orleans v. Salmen Brick and Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 868, 66
So. 237, 251 (1914) : "The only exception established by law in favor of municipal corporations is that their public property is not alienable and therefore
cannot be acquired by prescription. The character of municipal property and the
nature of its ownership, i.e., whether of a private or public nature, whether
alienable or inalienable, must be determined by the purpose to which the property
is dedicated." See also Louisiana Highway Commission v. Raxsdale, 12 So.2d 631
(La. App. 1943) ; note 193 infra. In Anderson v. Thomas, 166 La. 512, 526, 117
So. 573, 579 (1928), the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that municipal property of the private domain such as "public offices, police and fire stations, markets, schoolhouses . . . belongs to the municipality by which it has been acquired
and may be dealt with as the municipality sees fit, subject only to the restrictions
imposed by the deed of acquisition or by special laws."
87. Problems may arise in connection with the definition of the words "navi-

gable" and "river."

See text at notes 138, 139, 145 infra. In this study the word

river refers to any body of flowing water. Cf. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State

Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So.2d 61 (1943).

Problems may arise also with

regard to the definition of the words "banks" and "beds."

See Wemple v. Eastham,

150 La. 247, 251, 90 So. 637, 638 (1922) : "The bed of a navigable river-that is
the land which the state holds in her sovereign capacity-is only the land that is

covered by the water at its ordinary low stage. The land lying between the edge
of the water at its ordinary low stage and the line which the edge of the water
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ers" are mentioned separately in the same article, one could
think that the words "navigable rivers" refer to the body of
water rather than the bed. Thus, Article 453 read together with
Article 450 could be taken to indicate that while other running
water is a common thing, the water of navigable rivers is public.
However, a more reasonable interpretation is that Article 453
concerns the problem of the public use of navigable rivers rather
than the title to the waters, which as "running" are a common
thing owned by no one. This accords with the sources on which
88
Article 453 is based.
The ownership of water bottom is a complicated matter in
Louisiana.8 9 According to Article 453 "the beds of navigable
rivers, as long as the same are covered with water," are "public
things." On the basis of this article, and the doctrine of "in
herent sovereignty,"90 Louisiana courts have consistently held
that the beds of navigable rivers are not susceptible of private
ownership and belong to the state. While this interpretation of
Article 453 of the Civil Code is well settled today, its historical
foundation may still be questioned. "Public" rivers in Roman
law were merely rivers subject to public use, and as such, were
not susceptible of private ownership, even by the state.9 1 Further, in the French Civil Code, navigable rivers and their beds
are part of the public domain of the state and this means that
the interest of the state in navigable rivers and their beds is of a
public law nature (domanialitd publique) rather than private
law ownership (propriet priv6).o2 In the light of such sources,
it is doubtful whether the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code
intended to vest full civil law ownership of the beds of navigable
rivers in the state. Most probably, their intention was to place
reaches at its ordinary high state-that is, the highest stage that it usually
reaches at its ordinary high stage-is called the bank of the stream, and belongs
to the owner of the adjacent land."
88. For an analysis of Roman sources bearing on the legal status of public
rivers, see BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 186 (1921). Today, the use
of the water in navigable rivers, and title to it, is regulated by the Revised Statutes. See note 35 supra.
89. See text at notes 47, 51 supra; text at notes 104, 106, 140 infra.
90. See text at notes 106-112 infra; Comment, 12 TUr. L. REv. 428, 433
(1938). Cf. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 807, 173 So. 315, 322 (1936):
"The State as a sovereignty holds title to the beds of navigable bodies of water."
91. Of. note 69 supra. In any case, "ownership" of the beds of navigable rivers
or other waters had little significance as such prior to the discovery of oil. See
California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 749, 74 So.2d 1, 16 (1954): "I am most
confident, too, that but for the discovery of oil, this issue would never have been
raised."
92. See FRENCH CIvIL CODE art. 538; 3 DUGUIT, TBAITA DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 349 (1938).
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navigable rivers in Louisiana "out of commerce" and subject
them to public use in the interest of all. However, Louisiana
courts, relying on the broad definition of public things in Article
453, and on the consideration that navigable rivers are not susceptible of private ownership (interpreting the words "private
ownership" to mean ownership by private persons), reached the
conclusion that navigable rivers are susceptible of state ownership, and actually belong in full title to the state. State ownership extends to the mean low water mark of the bank. The bank
itself, namely the area between the low water mark and the mean
high water mark, is susceptible of private ownership and actually belongs to "those who possess the adjacent lands" (Article
455, paragraph 2).93
State ownership of the beds of navigable rivers in full title
has resulted in elimination of the public use of such beds. This,
in spite of the definition of public things in Article 453 and the
clear statement that "the use" of such things "is allowed to all
the members of the nation." Indeed, it is clear today that the
use and exploitation of the beds of navigable rivers is not free
but depends on lease, license, or patent issued by the state for
9
valuable consideration.

4

In view of the foregoing, one may question whether the beds
of navigable rivers in Louisiana are part of the public or of the
private domain of the state. If the public domain includes only
things subject to public use, 95 then riverbeds should be regarded,
necessarily, as a part of the private domain of the state. If, on
the other hand, as suggested, the criterion of the distinction between the public and the private domain is inalienability, 6 the
beds of navigable rivers should be classified as part of the public
domain, though they are not subject to public use.
93. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE, p. 96, art. 8 (1808) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 446 (1825).
See Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922) ; Morgan v. Livingston,
6 Mart.(O.S.) 19 (La. 1819). See also State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 350, 72
So. 984 (1916). In this case, the contention of the state that all land below the
ordinary high water mark belonged to it was rejected. The court held that all
exposed land in the "ordinary stage" of the waters belonged to the adjacent owners.
Ordinary stage must necessarily be understood as an imaginary line between the
mean low water and the mean high water mark.
94. See Smith v. Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 703, 101 So. 24, 28 (1924). The
interest of the state in the water bottom was described in that case as "property
which the state as owner had the right to lease to persons desiring to drill for
oil." Unauthorized use of the beds of navigable waters is a trespass. See State
v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 307, 163 So. 145, 146 (1935);
Smith v. Dixie Oil Co., supra.
95. Cf. text at note 77 supra.
96. Cf. text at note 80 supra.
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Problems arise in connection with changes in the physical
characteristics of the beds of navigable rivers. When a navigable
river ceases being navigable in fact, or completely dries out, it
has been suggested that its bed is no longer "public" and should
belong to the riparian landowners. 97 This is not the law in Louisiana, and it is at best questionable whether the law should be
so. Though the river may no longer be subject to public use, it
may well continue forming part of the private domain of the
state.9 Analogies drawn from the articles concerning alluvion
and from Article 518 of the Code miss the point. Article 518
concerns the completely different situation where a river abandons its bed and forms a new channel. In that case, Article 518
declares that the abandoned bed belongs in proportion to the
owners of the newly submerged lands. The conclusion then is
that when a navigable river ceases to be navigable, or abandons
its bed without forming a new channel, Article 518 is inapplicable, and the bed of the river belongs to the private domain
of the state. 99 This solution is in accord with the action of the
courts in analogous situations involving bottom ownership of
other navigable waters.
By reference to code articles concerning alluvion, it is settled in Louisiana that lands formed in rivers, whether navigable
or not, belong to the riparian landowners. 100 Newly submerged
lands, covered by navigable rivers, become part of the public
domain (Articles 453 and 518).101
97. See Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership 13, at WEST'S LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE preceding Art. 448

(1938).

(1950);

Comment, 12 TUL. L.

REV. 428, 432

However, Article 453 of the Civil Code indicates that the beds of navi-

gable rivers are "public, .... so long as the same are covered with water." Thus,
unless a river dries out completely, it does not cease being "public"; the fact that
a river is no longer navigable does not terminate the public interest. In Roman
law, dried out beds of "public" rivers became the property of the adjoining owners.
See D.41.30.1; id. 41.1.65.2. However, it should be noted that rivers in Roman law

were public merely quoad usum, while in Louisiana title to river beds is vested in
the state.
98. When a river is no longer navigable, or dries out completely, public use
necessarily terminates and the bed cannot be regarded as "re3 extra commercium."
If Article 453 merely intended to safeguard the public interest in navigation and
transportation, and did not intend to vest full title in the state, in case of
termination of the public use title to the bed could be granted to the former

riparian owners. But in the light of the Louisiana decisions declaring that the
state has title in full ownership to the beds of navigable rivers, the only possible

conclusion is that, upon termination of the public use, the bed of the river becomes
part of the private domain of the state.
99. This means that the state can validly transfer title to private individuals.
Past practice, however, indicates that an enabling act authorizing sale may be
necessary. Thus, sale by the state of lands in dried out navigable lakes was
specifically authorized by Act 124 of 1862. Cf. text at note 119 inIra.
100. See State v. Richardson, 140 La. 330, 72 So. 985 (1916).
101. The question seems to have been settled definitively in Miami Corp. v.

1961]

COMMON, PUBLIC, AND PRIVATE THINGS

717

(2) Other navigable waters: Lakes, bays, and sounds. Waters, other than the sea and rivers, are not classified by the
Code. However, navigable waters, such as lakes, bays, and
sounds, are also excluded from the sphere of private ownership
10
and belong to the state.

2

Navigable waters are subject to public use for the purpose
of navigation and transportation, and thus the central problem
in this area concerns title to the water bottom. 10 8 In that regard,
state "ownership" of navigable waters and their bottoms seems
to be the rule. Such ownership is founded on statutory legislation, the judicial doctrine of "inherent sovereignty," and on a
broad interpretation of Article 453 of the Civil Code.
A series of statutes enacted by the Louisiana legislature since
the middle of the past century resulted in establishing state ownership on several bodies of water and their bottoms. 104 Such statutes could not, and did not, encroach upon existing private
rights; their effect, in accordance with principles of constitutional law, was to vest title in the state of lands and waters heretofore owned by no one. 10
As statutory legislation could not have retroactive effect,
Louisiana courts assumed the task of promoting state interests
by proclaiming that navigable waters and their bottoms had been
insusceptible of private ownership since 1812, the date Louisiana
State, 186 La. 784, 809, 173 So. 315, 323 (1936). The court in that case held
that the state acquired title to submerged lands, without deciding the issue whether
or not the particular body of navigable water involved was a river or a lake. It
was simply declared that "the rule is, that when submersion occurs, the submerged
portion becomes a part of the bed of the navigable body of water in fact, and
therefore the property of the State, by virtue of its inherent sovereignty, as a
matter of law." This solution accords with Roman sources. See D.43.12.1.7:
"Ille alveus quem sibi flumen fecit et si privatus ante fruit, incipit tamen esse
publicus."
102. See text at notes 104, 116, 120 infra. See also Comments, Navigability
as Applied to Lakes in Louisiana, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 698 (1946) ; Ownership of Beds of Navigable Waters, 30 Tur. L. REV. 115 (1955) ; Ownership of
the Beds of Navigable Lakes, 21 TUL. L. REV. 454 (1947) ; Alluvion and Dereliction in Lakes, 7 TUL. L. REV. 438 (1933).
103. Even when beds of navigable waters are privately owned, "their full enjoyment may be said to be somewhat impaired by reason of the superior rights of
the government and the public to the unhampered use of the water above them
for navigation, commerce, fishing and the like." California Co. v. Price, 225 La.
706, 734, 74 So.2d 1, 11 (1954).
104. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 49:3 (1950), incorporating La. Acts 1886, No. 106;
LA. R.S. 9:1101 et seq. (1950), incorporating La. Acts 1910, No. 258. See also
text at note 241 infra.
105. La. Acts 1910, No. 258, and La. Acts 1886, No. 106, confirmed in express
terms pre-existing private rights. Of. text at notes 141-143 infra; Comment, 21
TUL. L. REV. 454, 469 (1947). See also Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 820,
173 So. 315, 327 (1936).
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was admitted to the Union. This was done by relying on the doctrine of "inherent sovereignty" and on Article 453 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
The doctrine of "inherent sovereignty" is a judicial construction of dubious antiquity'"o designed to rationalize state "ownership" of the bottoms of navigable waters. According to this
doctrine, the original states in the Union took sovereignty over
all navigable waters within their territories from the British
Crown. Subsequent admissions to the Union were on an equal
basis. For this reason, Louisiana in 1812 took ownership of all
navigable waters within the state. The historical and dogmatic
premises of the doctrine have been questioned repeatedly ;107 yet,
it seems to be still determinative of the outcome in most cases
involving disputed ownership of riparian lands and water bottoms.
Actually, the doctrine of inherent sovereignty confuses sovereignty and ownership ("imperium" and "dominium") and accords with obscure medieval conceptions rather than ancient Roman law or continental civil law.10 8 State sovereignty naturally
extends over all property situAted within its borders - and not
only over navigable waters. State property, on the other hand,
may be acquired in accordance with the provisions governing
acquisition of ownership in general, or in accordance with legislation proclaiming state title over property belonging to no one
in particular. It is confusing to talk of deriving "ownership"
from "sovereignty."
106. The doctrine was first announced in State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co.,
130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912). Actually, this was an adoption of the common
law rule according to which title to the bottom of navigable waters is vested in
the sovereign. Cf. State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163
So. 145 (1935) ; State v. Standard Oil Co., 164 La. 334, 113 So. 867 (1927);
Ellerbe v. Grace, 162 La. 846, 111 So. 185 (1926) ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La.
635, 101 So. 4 (1924) ; Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922) ;
State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919) ; State v. Richardson, 140 La.
329, 72 So. 984 (1916)
Slattery v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 138 La. 793, 70
So. 906 (1916). Early Louisiana cases indicate that the bottom of navigable
waters was "not susceptible of private ownership" rather than it belonged to the
state in full ownership. See Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838).
107. See Comments, 30 TUL. L. REV. 115 (1955), 21 TuL. L. REV. 454, 457
(1947), 12 TUL. L. REV. 428 (1938).
108. Cf. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (1930)
"In modern law, as a result of the medieval confusion of the power of the sovereign
to regulate the use of things (imperium) with ownership (dominium) and of
the idea of the corporate personality of the State, we have made the second category into property of public corporations. And this has required modern systematic
writers to distinguish between things which cannot be owned at all, such as human
beings, things which may be owned 'by public corporations but may not be transferred, and things which are owned by public corporations in full dominium."
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Further, it is difficult to see how Louisiana took an original
title to the bottoms of navigable waters by its mere admission to
the Union. The only mention of navigable waters, at that time,
was the following: "the river Mississippi and navigable rivers
and waters leading into the same or into the Gulf of Mexico, shall
be common highways and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants
of the said states as to other citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor, imposed by the said
state."'109 Thus, clearly, there was no federal grant of ownership
on the beds of navigable rivers, or, for that matter, on the bottoms of any navigable waters. Nor did the admission on an equal
basis mean that Louisiana had to follow the common law rule
that the state is owner of the beds of navigable rivers and
lakes." 0 Indeed, there are common law states that do not follow
this rule."' Thus, the doctrine of inherent sovereignty may
simply explain state sovereignty ("imperium") over all navigable waters and water bottoms, a self-evident fact. It may also
explain state ownership ("dominium") of waters and beds
owned by no one at the time the doctrine was first announced.
But it cannot explain vesting of title in the state over navigable
waters and beds at the time Louisiana was admitted into the
Union. 1 2
Finally, it is apparently on the basis of Article 453 of the
Civil Code that the state claims ownership of the beds of navigable waters other than rivers, although that article mentions
only "navigable rivers."" 8 Analogous application of Article 453
to other bodies of water is, perhaps, the least questionable basis
109. Act of April 14, 1812, c. 57, 2 Stat. 641, 642, 703.
110. Cf. Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926). See also Comments, 12
TUL. L. REV. 428, 434 (1938), 21 TUL. L. REV. 454, 457 (1947).
111. See e.g., Michigan: Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18, 17 Am. Dec. 435
(1860). In New York, navigable lakes may be either public or private. See Smith
v. The City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463 (1883) ; People v. System Properties,
281 App. Div. 433, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 269 (3d Dep't 1953). See also Illinois Central
Ry. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Thies v. Platte Valley Public Power
and Irrigation District, 137 Neb. 344, 289 N.W. 386 (1939).
112. It seems that private ownership of the beds of navigable waters was a
legal impossibility in the period preceding statehood. Indeed, under French and
Spanish laws, at least navigable rivers and their beds were considered insusceptible
of private ownership, whether by the state or by any other person. See note 114
infra.
113. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 453 (1870). Cf. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La.
784, 795, 173 So. 315, 319 (1936) : "Although Article 453 and the other Articles
cited do not specifically mention navigable lakes among public things, the courts
have included such lakes among public things, and have repeatedly held that if a
lake is navigable in fact, and was navigable in fact as of date 1812, the bed of the
lake is a public thing, and title is vested in the State."
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1 4
of exclusive state rights since the period preceding statehood. 1

The public interest protected by Article 453 is the free use of
navigable waters for transportation and other commercial purposes. And if, as a guaranty of that interest, ownership of the
beds of navigable rivers should be vested in the state, for the

same reasons, ownership of the bottoms of other navigable waters might be vested in the state." 5
The issue concerning the dogmatic foundation of state rights
in the beds of navigable waters has as such little practical significance today. What is important to determine is the scope of

that inherent sovereignty, and, particularly, whether the property vested in the state is part of the public or of the private
domain, and whether it is subject to public use or not.

It has been a well-established general proposition in Louisiana that the bottoms of navigable waters are inalienable by the
state and forever insusceptible of private ownership." 6 An involved course of legislative action, however, and judicial inter-

pretation thereof, resulted in recent years in the recognition of
private ownership in the beds of navigable waters other than

rivers.
Originally, the prohibition against alienation by the state of

the bottoms of navigable waters was based on the interpretation
placed by the courts on Article 453 of the Civil Code. The first
statutory prohibition occurred in 1886 when Act 106 of that year

declared that the state owned all waters adjoining the Gulf and
at the same time provided that state ownership of these waters
114. The provision of Article 453 has its origin in the so-called Code of 1808,
entitled Digest of the Civil Laws in Force in the Territory of Orleans, p. 94, art. 6.
However, designation of rivers :nd their beds as "public" does not necessarily
mean vesting of full title in the state. Cf. text at note 92 supra. Under preexisting French and Spanish law in Louisiana, the beds of navigable rivers were
not owned by anyone. See 1 OEUVRES DE DOMAT 115 (1931);
PARTIDAs 3.28.6 (Transl. by Moreau Lislet and Carleton, 1820).

LAS

SIETE

115. See Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 809, 173 So. 315, 323 (1936)
"If this were not so, there could be a complete rim of privately owned submerged
lands around the entire circumference of a navigable lake. This is wholly undesirable and destructive of progress, because it would practically deprive the
public of the use of the lake under State laws." But cf. text at notes 133-135
infra.
116. See Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 1.73 So. 315 (1936); Saint v.
Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So. 812, 813 (1928) ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94,
83 So. 421 (1919) ; Roussel v. Grant, 14 Orl. App. 52 (1916) ; State v. Bayou
Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 615, 58 So. 405, 409 (1912) ; Navigation Co. v.
Oyster Commission, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910) ; Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La.
324 (1838). But cf. California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 734, 74 So.2d 1, 11
(1954) holding that the bottoms of navigable lakes and bays "are by their nature
susceptible or capable of private ownership."
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should be continued and maintained."17 Subsequently, the prohibition was fortified by the judicial doctrine of "inherent sovereignty," and, finally, the Constitution of Louisiana was amended in 1921 to include a provision prohibiting the alienation of
or other body
"the fee of the bed of any navigable stream, lake
118
reclamation."
of
purposes
for
except
of water,
In the meanwhile, however, Act 247 of 1855 authorized sale
by the state of shallow non-navigable lakes and swamplands recently acquired under grant from the United States, 119 and Act
124 of 1862 assimilated dried out navigable lakes to "swampland" and removed the prohibition against alienation as to such
lands.120 On the basis of these two statutes, patents were issued
by the state frequently involving large areas containing both
non-navigable and navigable waters. Whether by inadvertence
or intentionally, no special mention was made reserving title to
navigable waters in the state, and several years thereafter the
question arose as to whether or not such patents could convey
title to navigable waters. Thus, in order to promote security of
titles, the Louisiana legislature passed Act 62 of 1912. This act
provided that all suits to annul or vacate patents issued by the
state must be brought within six years of the issuance of the
patent, or within six years of the passage of the act.121 On the
117. See La. Acts 1886, No. 106, now LA. R.S. 49:3 (1950). Issues raised
under this act were involved in State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604,
58 So. 405 (1912). See also La. Acts 1892, No. 10; 1896, No. 121; 1902, No. 153;
1904, No. 52; 1910, No. 189; 1914, No. 54; 1924, No. 139; 1932, No. 67.
118. See LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See also Comment, 21 TUL. L. REV. 454
(1947). "Prior to 1921 the Legislature had the power to change the mentioned
codal or legislative declaration and to make such property alienable to individuals."
California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 715, 74 So.2d 1, 3, 4 (1954). However, the
dissent in the same case indicated that no act has ever been enacted in Louisiana
authorizing sale of navigable waters, and this manifests a firm legislative and
judicial policy against alienability of such waters. Id. at 760, 74 So.2d at 20.
In England, the Crown can alienate the beds of navigable waters, subject to the
continuation of the public use. See Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. and Aid. 268, 275,
106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821) ; The Attorney General v. Terry, 9 Ch. App.
423 (1874).
119. See La. Acts 1855, No. 247. By Acts of March 2, 1849 (9 Stat. 352, c.
87) and of Sept. 28, 1950 (9 Stat. 519, c. 84), the United States conveyed to
Louisiana certain lands for reclamation purposes. These lands were not insusceptible of private ownership and could be conveyed by the state to private
individuals. However, though this was perhaps unnecessary, sale of such lands was
authorized by La. Acts 1855, No. 247.
120. See La. Acts 1862, No. 124. Perhaps, as in the case of the lands acquired under the federal grant (note 119 supra), legislative authorization for the
sale of dried out navigable lakes was unnecessary. Such lands were no longer
subject to public use, and formed part of the private rather than the public
domain.
121. See LA. R.S. 9:5661 (1950). Since it is clear that the Louisiana legislature could, in the absence of constitutional provision, authorize the sale of navigable waters, it is merely a problem of interpretation whether Act 62 of 1912
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basis of this statute it has been held that conveyances which included beds of navigable waters without special mention reserv122
ing title of them to the state are valid and no longer assailable.
It is in this way that Louisiana arrived at private ownership of
the bottom of navigable waters. 123
This development might lead to the conclusion that the bottoms of navigable waters other than rivers belong to the private
rather than the public domain of the state. This conclusion, however, is not warranted today. The cases which recognized private ownership in the bottoms of navigable lakes were decided
on the basis of facts occurring prior to the 1921 amendment of
the Louisiana Constitution. 124 This amendment, prohibiting
alienation, brought all navigable waters within the public domain
of the state. Thus, patents issued after 1921 purporting to alienate tracts which include both non-navigable and navigable waters would be clearly ineffectual as to the latter.
intended to cure patents conveying only non-navigable waters or both navigable
and non-navigable waters. The majority view in the celebrated case, California
Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 739, 74 So.2d 1, 12 (1954), was that "the legislature
intended that the Act was to be all inclusive, in conformity with the language
used therein." A vigorous dissent indicated that "a reasonable interpretation of
the statute would be that it only applies to property susceptible of ownership."
Id. at 750, 74 So.2d at 17.
122. See Humble Oil Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839
(1953), Note, 14 LOUisIANA LAW REVIEW 267 (1953). See O'Brien v. State
Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So.2d 470 (1946) ; Realty Operators Inc. v. State
Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So.2d 198 (1943) ; State v. Sweet Lake Land
and Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927) (all cases involving title to the
bottom of inland waters). In California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1
(1954), the rule was extended to the bed of an arm of the sea. This holding has
been criticized: see Dainow, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court of the
1953-1954 Term, Property, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 273, 275 (1955). By La.
Acts 1954, No. 727, now LA. R.S. 9:1107-1109 (1950), the Louisiana legislature
sought to overrule the California case. The act states that the previous Act 62
of 1912 did not intend to cure patents to the beds of navigable waters, and that
all patents "heretofore or hereafter" issued purporting to convey beds of navigable
waters are null and void. Doubts as to the constitutionality of the act have been
voiced. See Comment, 30 Tur. L. REV. 115, 125, 126 (1955); Hebert and
Lazarus, Legislation Affecting the Civil Code, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 9, 21
(1954).
123. A certain inconsistency in judicial action should be noted: on the one
hand, private ownership of the bottoms of navigable waters may be acquired
through state patents (California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954)),
and, on the other hand, the same bottoms are declared insusceptible of private
ownership in cases involving eroded lands or receding waters (Miami Corp. v.
State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936), text at note 132 infra).
124. See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954). However,
the gates are wide open for private individuals to "claim title under old patents
to the beds of numerous bays of the Gulf, large lakes, etc. from which oil is being
or will be produced." Id. at 785, 74 So.2d at 29, dissenting opinion. Earlier cases
recognizing private interests in the beds of inland navigable waters based their
holdings on the additional consideration that the waters involved, though navigable, were insignificant for commercial purposes. See O'Brien v. State Mineral
Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So.2d 470 (1945). This criterion has been obviously abandoned in the California Company ease.
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State ownership of navigable waters other than rivers extends to the mean high water mark of the banks. With regard
to such waters, there is no article in the Code corresponding to
Article 455, paragraph 2, which vests title to the banks of
navigable rivers in the riparian landowners, and it has been
held that the banks or shores of such waters belong to the
state. 125 Changes in the physical characteristics of navigable
bodies of water, other than rivers, involve therefore distinct
problems. The most troublesome question in that regard is
whether Articles 509 and 510 of the Civil Code concerning alluvion and dereliction apply to these bodies of water. 126 Litigation
on this question may arise by a claim of the riparian owner to
alluvion additions or to lands uncovered by receding waters, or
through a claim by the state to submerged lands.

The question of title to alluvion additions and lands uncovered by receding waters was first raised in cases involving Lake

Pontchartrain. In these early cases, Lake Pontchartrain was
classified as an "arm of the sea," and it was announced at the
same time that the rules concerning alluvion and dereliction were
inapplicable to the sea and its arms. 127 The same rule was sub-

sequently applied in the leading case of Slattery v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Co.,

28

involving disputed title to uncovered lands

125. See Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315, 325 (1936) ; State
v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935)
New
Orleans Land Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 171 La. 718, 132 So. 121,
123 (1930) ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924) ; Sapp v. Frazier,
51 La. Ann. 1718, 26 So. 378 (1899). See also Comment, Alluvion and Dereliotion in Lakes, 7 TuL. L. REV. 438 (1933).
126. The question whether state and private rights are affected by subsequent
non-navigability of waters which were navigable in fact in 1812 has been settled
long ago. The rule is that the state's title is not lost by subsequent non-navigability of a lake which can be shown to have been navigable in 1812. See State v.
Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So.2d 136 (1944) ; Slattery v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co.,
138 La. 793, 70 So. 806 (1916).
127. See Bruning v. New Orleans, 165 La. 511, 115 So. 733 (1928) ; Burns
v. Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906) ; Zeller v.
Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882). Of. text at notes 39, 43 supra. In
Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, supra, dicta indicated that alluvion and dereliction
applied to rivers exclusively, the only waters mentioned in Articles 509 and 510
of the Code. Today, the issue whether a navigable body of water is an arm of
the sea or an inland fresh water lake cannot be determinative of the outcome of a
case involving disputed ownership to water bottoms or uncovered lands. In New
Orleans Land Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 171 La. 718, 132 So. 121,
123 (1930), the court declared that "the legal situation . . . is the same in either
case."
128. 138 La. 793, 70 So. 806 (1916). In that case, the lands in question had
been uncovered as a result of artificial drainage. The court held that Article 510
could not apply for the additional reason that the change was not "imperceptible."
An apparent inconsistency in judicial action should be mentioned in this connection. If the rule inclusio unios eat exclusio alterius is to be followed in interpreting Articles 509 and 510 of the Code, perhaps the same rule should apply in
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in formerly navigable lakes along the Red River. The lack of
specific provisions concerning alluvion and dereliction along the
banks of navigable waters other than rivers, and the lack of a
provision similar to Article 355, paragraph 2, was thus seized
upon by the courts to defeat claims for extension of private
ownership. In measuring the boundary between private and
state property, in cases involving claims to uncovered lands, the
high water mark of 1812 is ordinarily taken as an immutable
line. 129 In one case, however, the low water mark of 1812 was
taken into account, and in another the boundary was measured
80
from the low water mark existing at the time of litigation.1
General adoption of the latter rule would achieve the same result as the application of the law of alluvion and accretion to
navigable waters other than rivers.
One would, perhaps, expect that since additions to the land
become state property, submerged lands would not be lost to the
riparian owners. This issue was involved in State v. Erwin.'8 1
In that case, it was announced that since Articles 509 and 510
of the Civil Code did not apply to navigable waters other than
rivers, riparian owners retained title to newly submerged lands.
A vigorous dissent, however, indicated that the public policy
expressed in Articles 450 and 453 of the Civil Code precluded
private ownership of the beds of all navigable waters. In the
subsequent case of Miami Corp. v. State,132 a divided court overthe interpretation of Article 453. Yet the latter article has been applied by
analogy to waters other than rivers. The explanation seems to be in the concern
of the courts to promote state interests rather than in the fact that the restrictive
interpretation placed on Articles 509 and 510 accords with Roman law sources.
Of. SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6mIscIHEr
RECHTS 303 (1923).
129. It was so held in the leading cases State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 786, 20 So.2d
136 (1944), and State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So.
145 (1935).
130. Smith v. Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 702, 101 So. 24 (1924) (low water
mark of 1812) ; Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922). In the latter
case, a bayou which was navigable in 1812 had ceased to be so at the time of the
suit, and the waters had uncovered a large tract of land. The court granted title
to these lands to the riparian owner, by measuring the boundary from the low
water mark existing at the time of litigation. In effect, the court applied to the
bayou the rule governing alluvion in rivers and streams. Cf. text at note 101
supra.
131. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
132. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936). Considerable doubt has been cast upon
the holding in the Miami case by the majority in California Co. v. Price, 225 La.
706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954). The dissent pointed out that "the majority ruling in
effect overrules the holding in the Miami case" (id. at 747, 74 So.2d at 15) and
that "the majority of the court, by permitting an arm of the sea to be privately
owned, is rein8tating the holding in the Erwin case, 8upra, that water bottoms
or beds of this kind are susceptible of private ownership." Id. at 784, 74 So.2d
at 28. The majority, indeed, disagreed with the holding in the Miami case that
navigable waters are insusceptible of private ownership under Articles 450 and
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ruled the Erwin case. The majority was now of the opinion that
the bottom of a navigable body of water belongs to the state by
virtue of its sovereignty, and also as being a public thing, not
susceptible of private ownership under Articles 450 and 453 of
the Civil Code.
This obviously inequitable result was merely the consequence
of confusion of two separable concepts, namely "public use" and
"state ownership." Indeed, reliance on public policy in connection with Article 453 of the Civil Code to divest riparians of
their title to submerged lands was allegedly in the interest of
the "public use" of such waters. Justice Higgins, writing for
the majority, reasoned that: "Beyond the points where the shore
was in 1812, one using the lake, although navigable, would be
a trespasser on private property, and the trespasser would have
no right to use the bank which was not inundated, since it would
not be the bank of a navigable public water."' 1 However, public
use and state title may be well separable, as it has been already
stated;134 and, further, private ownership of submerged lands
is not necessarily incompatible with public use. The real problem
is, who should be entitled to derive economic benefits from the
exploitation of the minerals beneath the water bottom? And,
as the dissent pointed out, the navigability of lakes is "not obstructed any more" where oil derricks are erected in accordance
with leases acquired from private owners than leases acquired
1
from the state. 5
Thus, apart from the confusion of ideas, there appears to
482 of the Civil Code, but actually distinguished the Miami case on the ground
that it dealt with erosion rather than acquisition by state patent. The implication seems to be that the Miami case is still the law to the extent it stands for the
limited proposition that lands eroded by navigable waters are insusceptible of
private ownership. Of. note 101 supra.
133. 186 La. 784, 798, 173 So. 315, 319 (1937).
134. Cf. text at notes 70-71 supra. Separation of the problem of title from
the problem of public use was recognized in California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706,
734, 74 So.2d 1, 11 (1954). The dissent in the same case failed to realize that
private ownership is not necessarily incompatible with public use (id. at 770, 74
So.2d at 23). However, in case of private ownership, public use results in the
restriction of rights incidental thereto "by reason of the superior rights of the
government and the public to the unhampered use." (Id. at 734, 74 So.2d at 11,
majority opinion). English law has made private ownership and public use of
navigable waters compatible by subjecting the use of these waters to a public
servitude. A. G. v. Tomline, 14 Ch. D. 57 (1878) ; Williams v. Wilcox, 8 Ad. & E.
314, 112 Eng. Rep. 857 (Q.B. 1838). To the same effect is the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
135. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 863, 173 So. 315, 341 (1936). However, application of Article 453 by analogy to navigable waters other than rivers
for the limited purpose of navigation and transportation rather than to establish
state title to the bed is well-founded. See Franklin, Equity in Louisiana, 9 TUL.
L. REV. 485 (1935).
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be no other reason for vesting title to submerged lands in the
state, and thus "enriching" the latter unjustifiedly at the expense of its citizens.
As Miami Corp. v. State was decided on grounds of public
policy, and by reference to Articles 450 and 453 of the Civil
Code, the issue of applicability of Articles 509 and 510 to waters
other than rivers was circumvented. 136 Subsequent cases seem
to concede inapplicability, and concentrate mostly on the issue
whether or not a body of water is a river. Obviously, the applicability of Articles 509 and 510 with regard to uncovered
lands depends on that determination.1 17 According to a test devised by Louisiana courts, a body of water having no current
and being merely a wide area in the course of a river, will be
regarded as a lake or bay. 188 On the other hand, a body of water
which has a current and which does not enjoy a popular identity
separate from the river of which it is a part will be regarded
as a river. 89 Under such tests, conflicting determinations may
be expected in case a body of water has a current and is large
enough to be popularly regarded as a lake or bay.
(3) Non-navigable waters. Non-navigable bodies of water
lie outside the public domain and are susceptible of private
ownership. Such bodies of water are not covered by the code
provisions concerning public things or the inherent sovereignty
136. Of. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 819, 173 So. 315, 327 (1936):
"[T]he bed or bottom of Grand Lake, a navigable body of water . . . belongs to
the State of Louisiana, by virtue of its sovereignty, it being a public thing and
insusceptible of private ownership under the provisions of articles 450 and 453
of the Revised Civil Code. Having reached the above conclusion, it is unnecessary
to consider the applicability of articles 509 and 510 of the Revised Civil Code to
this case."
137. See State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 786, 20 So.2d 136 (1944) ; Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 13 So.2d 61 (1943). The
issue whether a navigable body of water is a river or not is important, and may
determine the outcome of case, only with regard to uncovered lands. With regard
to lands eroded by navigable waters, the rule is the same as to all waters. See
Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 734, 173 So. 315, 323 (1936) : "[T]he rule is, that
when submersion occurs, the submerged portion becomes a part of the bed or
bottom of the navigable body of water in fact, and therefore the property of the
State, by virtue of its inherent sovereignty, as a matter of law."
138. See State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931). See also Miami
Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 791, 173 So. 315, 317 (1936) : "The name 'lake' is
applied to various wide places in the river, some of which are widened to so little
extent that the widening is scarcely perceptible"; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v.
State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 495, 14 So.2d 61, 68 (1943): "[A] lake does
not imply a body of water in which a current flows, but it indicates a body of
water more or less stagnant, in which the water is supplied from drainage."
139. See Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 495,
14 So. 2d 61, 69 (1943) : "A river is distinguished from a lake in that it flows,
more or less, in a permanent bed or channel between defined banks or walls with
a current, whereas streams are bodies of flowing water including rivers."
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doctrine, and are consistently held to belong to the riparian
aplandowners. 140 The ownership of each landowner extends
4
parently to the geographical center of the body of water.1 1
Drastic changes in the water and property law occurred in
1910, when the Louisiana legislature passed Act 258. This act
provided that "The waters of and in all bayous, lagoons, lakes
and bays and the beds thereof, within the borders of the state
not at present under the direct ownership of any person, firm,
or corporation are hereby declared to be the property of the
State."'142 Though the language of the act is sufficiently broad
to include both navigable and non-navigable waters, its practical significance has been mostly felt in connection with problems involving non-navigable waters. By the time the act was
passed, the law governing navigable waters had been settled and
state title had been repeatedly affirmed.
The act did not encroach upon existing private rights; it
merely vested title in the state to waters and beds which were
not under the "direct" ownership of any person. What is "direct"
ownership, however, is not clear. Perhaps the term was inserted
in the statute to exclude future claims by riparian landowners
to alluvion additions and derelictions based on bank or shore
ownership. Indeed, additions to the land cannot be regarded
as being under the direct ownership of the riparian owner. Yet,
this interpretation cannot be reconciled with the cases holding
that with regard to lands adjoining non-navigable water the
ownership of the riparians
extends to the geographical center
1 43
of the water involved.

In any case, it seems that before 1910, there were bodies of
non-navigable waters which were not owned directly either by
the state or by private persons. As to these waters, Articles 509
140. See Burns v. Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249
(1906) ; Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922). There are, indeed,
several decisions holding that the bed of a non-navigable body of water belongs to
the adjoining landowners. It has been observed, however, that in each of them
the water concerned was not a "lake," as to which different rules might apply.
See Comment, 6 LOmSIANA LAW REVIEW 698, 703 (1946).
141. "The beds of streams that are not and never were navigable belong to
the riparian owners, to the thread or middle of the stream." Wemple v. Eastham,
150 La. 247, 253, 90 So. 637, 638 (1922). See also Amite Gravel and Sand Co. v.
Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 87 So. 718 (1921) ; Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson,
141 La. 874, 75 So. 806 (1917) ; State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 780, 861, 20 So. 2d 136,
160 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
142. See La. Acts 1910, No. 258, now LA. R.S. 9:1101 et 8eq. (1950). Issues
raised under this act were involved in State v. Standard Oil Co., 164 La. 334, 113
So. 867 (1927).
143. Of. text at note 141 aupra.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. XXI

and 510 of the Code could be determinative of the issue of title
to additions and derelictions. After 1910, as title was vested
in the state, claims to accretions by riparians became claims
against state owned rather than against unclaimed land. And
it should be expected that the courts will be reluctant to extend private property at the expense of the state. In the case of
State v. Aucoin,'" strong dicta indicated that the law of alluvion
and dereliction would not apply to non-navigable bodies of water
other than rivers. The case actually involved a suit by the state
to determine the boundary between the land that once was the
bed of Lake Long, and the adjoining land owned by the private
defendant. The issue was decided on a finding, in accordance
with the contentions of the state, that Lake Long was navigable
in 1812. As a result, according to long-established practice,
Articles 509 and 510 of the Code were not controlling.
In the converse situation that lands bordering state-owned
non-navigable waters become inundated, no reasons of public
policy may be invoked to divest riparian landowners of their
title to the submerged lands. Accordingly, it may be expected
that in proper cases Louisiana courts will refuse to press state
claims to that extreme.
Since, at least prior to 1910, different rules applied to navigable and non-navigable waters with regard to both accretion
and erosion, and after 1910, different rules may apply with
regard to erosion, it may be of importance in some cases to
determine whether a body of water is or has been navigable. No
clear test of navigability has been devised, however, and the
determination is made in most instances as a question of fact. 1 45
In the case of State v. Aucoin, it was declared that to be navigable it is necessary that a body of water "either be used or be
susceptible of being used 'in their ordinary condition, as high144. See State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 786, 826, 20 So. 2d 136, 149 (1944) : "Certainly the riparian rights of an owner of land bordering upon a lake do not entitle
him to become the owner of the bed of the lake by the effect of its becoming dry,
either in whole or in part, if the state owns the bed of the lake while it is covered
with water." Non-navigable lakes alienated by the state under Act 247 of 1855
have been classified by the courts as "land," as to which the law of accretion and
dereliction does not apply. See McDade v. Bossier Levee Board, 109 La. 625,
634, 33 So. 628, 631 (1902).
145. See State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145,
150 (1935) : "[A] body of water is navigable in law, when it is navigable in fact."
The burden of proof is on the party claiming that the body of water in question
is or has been navigable. See Transcontinental Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Co., 209
La. 52, 24 So. 2d 248 (1945). See also Comment, 6 LouisIANA LAW REVIEW 698
(1946).

1961]

COMMON, PUBLIC, AND PRIVATE THINGS

729

ways of commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on

water.'

"146

(4) Highways, roads and streets. The Civil Code of Louisiana has placed highways, roads, and streets in the category
of "public things," namely "things ... the property of which is

vested in a whole nation, and the use of which is allowed to all
members of the nation" (Article 453). However, notwithstanding the wording of Article 453, it is an accepted principle in
Louisiana today that highways, roads, and streets are "public"
merely in the sense that they are subject to public use and not,
necessarily, the property of the state.1 47 Accordingly, title to the
soil of highways, streets, and roads may be vested in the state,
municipalities, or even private persons. While public use continues, the issue of title has some practical significance,'1 48 although considerations of public convenience are generally controlling. Upon termination of the public use, however, the question of title regains its full significance as it may be determinative of conflicting claims concerning ownership of the land
formerly occupied by the highway, road, or street. Ordinarily,
the question of title depends on the nature of the thing con146. 206 La. 787, 855, 20 So.2d 136, 158 (1944). See also Amite Gravel and
Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 87 So. 718 (1921) ; Delta Duck
Club v. Barrios, 135 La. 357, 65 So. 489 (1914) ; Comment, Tests of Navigability
of Stream, 30 TUL. L. REV. 332 (1956).
147. Thus, it has been held that title to things subject to public use cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription. See Locke v. Lester, 78 So. 2d 14, 16
(La. App. 1955) ; Mayor v. Magnon, 4 Mart.(O.S.) 2. 9 (La. 1815) ; Kemp v.
Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934). The right of the public to
the unobstructed use of things dedicated to public use cannot be lost by (liberative) prescription. See Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So. 812, 814 (1928) ;
Ingram v. Police Jury of Parish of St. Tammany, 20 La. Ann. 226, 228 (1868).
Neither the land nor the revenues from land subject to public use may be seized.
See Kline v. Parish of Ascension, 33 La. Ann. 562 (1881). Possessory actions
adverse to the public claim may not be brought . See Keefe v. City of Monroe, 120
So. 102 (La. App. 1929). Finally, it has been frequently asserted that property
dedicated to public use is inalienable by the city or parish. See New Orleans v.
Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913) ; Shreveport v. Walpole, 22
La. Ann. 526 (1870) ; Burthe v. Blake and Town of Carrollton, 9 La. Ann. 244
(1854) ; McNeil v. Hicks, 34 La. Ann. 1090 (1882). See also New Orleans v.
Louisiana Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 229 La. 246, 259, 85
So.2d 503, 507 (1956) (municipality has no right to sell, without express legislative authority, property devoted to public use; municipality holds such property
"in trust for the use and benefit of the citizens").
148. For example, while the public use continues, the private owner may have
the right to extract minerals, provided that such operations are not incompatible
with public use. Of. Placid Oil Co. v. Hebert, 194 La. 788, 194 So. 893 (1940) ;
Flory, Who Gets the Royalty on Unit Production Allocated to Streets and Public
Roads?, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 51 (1955). The same principles apply in connection with private owned waterways. See California Co. v.
Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954) ; State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 350, 72
So. 984 (1916).
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cerned, and on the method according to which the public interest
is established. In that regard, distinction should be made between state highways, public roads, and streets.
The legal regime of state highways is regulated in considerable detail by the Revised Statutes. State highways are constructed, maintained, and administered by the Louisiana State
Department of Highways. 149 The Department may acquire "any
immovable property, or the use thereof, including servitudes,
lands, and improvements on lands, necessary for the right of
way.., by expropriation, by donation, by purchase, by exchange,
or by lease."' 50 Thus, title to the soil of state highways may be
vested in the state, municipalities, or private persons, depending
on the circumstances.
Lands acquired by purchase, exchange, donation, or expropriation in accordance with Articles 2626 through 2641 of the
Civil Code, or similar procedures established in the Revised
Statutes, 15 ' becomes the property of the state. Such property,
while public use continues, is clearly out of commerce, 15 2 and is
always exempt from the rules governing prescription.153 Upon

termination of the public use, the soil of former state highways
may become part of the private domain of the state. Accordingly,
such lands may be sold at the discretion of the department by
public or private sale.

54

149. See LA. R.S. 48:1 et seq. (1950). The word "highway" is defined as "a
public way for vehicular, mounted, and pedestrian traffic, including the entire
area dedicated thereto and the bridges, culverts, appurtenances, and features necessary to or associated with its purposes." Id. 48:1(11). See also id. 48:191 defining the highways which belong to the State Highway System. See id. 48:21:
"The functions of the department shall be to study, administer, construct, improve,
maintain, repair, and regulate the use of the state highway system."
150. See id. 48:217.
151. See LA. R.S. 48:218 (1950).
152. Cf. text at notes 70-71 supra; text at note 202 infra. In France, and in
other continental countries, it is a generally acceptable proposition that public
roads are part of the public domain of the state, whatever this term may mean.
See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITi PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 139 (1952) ;
text at note 72 supra. A similar statement in connection with Louisiana law would
be almost meaningless. The term public domain does not have a settled meaning
in Louisiana, and it has been suggested that an acceptable criterion would be
inalienability. Cf. text at note 80 aupra. Streets, roads, and highways, if state
owned, are not freely alienable state property. Yet, abandonment, relocation, and
sale of the soil are possible not only after termination of the public use, but also
while public use continues within the limits of a broad administrative discretion.
Of. text at notes 202-203 infra. An analytically correct classification should regard
streets, roads, and highway in Louisiana as things subject to public use, whether
state or privately owned. Whatever limitations are imposed on the owner of the
soil are the result of dedication to public use.
153. See LA. R.S. 48:226 (1950).
154. See id. 48:224.
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Special provisions in the Revised Statutes regulate the legal
regime of "public roads"'155 which are not part of the state highway system. 156 The administration, construction, and maintenance of such roads is delegated, in principle, to parish governing authorities and road districts created under the authority
of parish boards. 157 The title to such roads may be vested in
the state, its political subdivisions, or even private persons.
"Streets" within the limits of municipalities, if not a part of
the state highway system or not under the control of parish
authorities' 5" are administered by municipal authorities. As in
the case of highways and public roads, however, title to streets
does not necessarily belong to the municipality; it may well
belong to the state, parish, or private persons.
Rights-of-way for public roads and streets may be acquired
by parish and municipal authorities by any of the methods prescribed for the State Department of Highways,' 5 9 and may consist in the mere use of the soil or in full title to it. 16° In addition,
rights-of-way may be acquired by certain other methods which
need be considered separately.
An interest in the public use of a road or street may be established through the maintenance by a parish or municipality of
a road or street for a period of three years. Indeed, Section
48:491 of the Revised Statutes' 61 provides that "all roads and
streets... which have been or are hereafter kept up, maintained
or worked for three years by authority of any parish governing
authority in its parish or by authority of any municipal governing authority in its municipality shall be public roads or streets
as the case may be." This statute has been interpreted as establishing an independent basis for acquisiton of rights-of-way by
the public, distinguishable from dedication. 62 For the applica155. See id. 48:491, as amended: "All roads or streets in this state that are
opened, laid out or appointed by virtue of any act of the legislature or by virtue
of any order of any parish governing authority in any parish, or any municipal
governing authority in any municipality . . . shall be public roads or streets as
the case may be."
156. Cf. id. 48:471.
157. See id. 48:481, 48:571, 48:582.
158. Cf. id. 48:193, 48:491, 48:671, 48:701. See text at note 150 supra. Of. id.
48:491, 48:493, 48:582, and 33:3301 et 8eq.
159. In Louisiana, a municipality can acquire property by direct purchase,
expropriation, and dedication. Brasseaux v. Ducote, 6 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1942).
160. Land acquired under 48:491 et seq. of the Revised Statutes is a servitude
only. See Paret v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933);
Fuselier v. Police Jury, 109 La. 551, 33 So. 597 (1903).
161. See LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 639.
162. Porter v. Huckabay, 50 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 1951). See also Wharton
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tion of the statute it is sufficient that the authorities concerned
work the road without protest by the landowner. "Working and
maintaining" within the meaning of the statute should be something more than an occasional "brushing up" of a pathway by
public workmen. 16 3 According to a consistent line of cases, the
nature of the public interest created under the statute is a servi1 64
tude of passage; title to the property is retained by the owner,
and, in case of termination of the public use, his ownership
becomes complete.
A legal servitude may be imposed according to Article 665
of the Civil Code on the lands of "adjacent proprietors on the
shores of navigable rivers" for the "making and repairing of
• . .roads."

No compensation is due to the landowner for the

acquisition of a right-of-way in accordance with this article. To
defeat claims to compensation, Louisiana courts resorted to
legalistic constructions, holding that under Article 665 land is
not expropriated" but "appropriated" for the use to which it is
subject in accordance with an implied condition in the title of
the owners.' 5 The nature of the public interest is, according to
the Code, a mere servitude.
A number of cases limit application of Article 665 to purposes incidental to the use of the river.166 It was correctly pointed
out that to use the land for other than riparian purposes would
conflict with constitutional guaranties of property rights. 67
Further, according to the terms of the Code, application of
Article 665 is limited to the shores of navigable rivers. 68
In general, rights-of-way cannot be acquired in Louisiana
v. City of Alexandria, 226 La. 675, 77 So. 2d 1 (1955) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term -Property, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 229 (1956).
163. Bordelon v. Heard, 33 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 1947). Cf. The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term -Property, 13 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEw 230, 231 (1953).
164. See Paret v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768
(1933) ; Fuselier v. Police Jury, 109 La. 551, 33 So. 597 (1903) ; Bradley v.
Pharr, 45 La. Ann. 426, 12 So. 618 (1893). See also Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp.,
205 La. 988, 18 So. 2d 591 (1944).
165. See Peart v. Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 421, 12 So. 490 (1893).
166. See Hebert v. T. L. James and Co., 224 La. 498, 70 So. 2d 102 (1953)
Village of Moreauville v. Boyer, 138 La. 1070, 71 So. 187 (1916). Cf. The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term -Property, 15 LourSiANA LAW REVIEW 275 (1955).
167. Cf. Village of Moreauville v. Boyer, 138 La. 1070, 71 So. 187 (1916).
168. For tests of navigability, see text at note 146 supra. See also Comments,
Tests of Navigabiltiy of Stream, 30 TuL. L. REV. 332 (1956) ; Nature and Limits
of the Servitude of Roads along Navigable Rivers, 29 Tur,. L. REv. 799 (1955).
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by acquisitive prescription. 16 9 Article 765 of the Civil Code, however, provides that the public may acquire a servitude of passage
"by the open and public possession and use of a road for the
space of ten years, after the said road or servitude has been
declared a public highway by the Police Jury, provided that such
servitude so acquired shall not extend beyond the width of forty
feet." For several reasons, and perhaps mostly due to the development of the law governing dedication to public use, Article
765 has never been applied by the courts. In a number of cases
in which Article 765 was invoked to establish public interests,
its application was avoided by a statement that roads and streets
within the limits of a municipality were outside the scope of that
article. 7 0 And in a relatively recent case application of Article
765 was avoided on the ground that the prescriptive period of
ten years starts to run from the time the road is declared to be
17
public by the police jury. '
Public interests may also be created in roads and streets by
dedication of land to public use. Dedication by private individuals or corporations may be effected in either of two ways:
formally or informally. The difficulties in this area consist in
distinguishing the two kinds of dedication and in determining
the results of each.
The rules concerning informal dedication in Louisiana are
in the main borrowed from common law jurisdictions. 172 Early
in the last century, the Louisiana Supreme Court sought to check
the influx of common law notions in this field,' 73 but later either
through inadvertence 174 or intentionally, the trend was reversed
169. See in general, Schoenrich, Acquisition of Rights of Way by Prescription,
12 TUL. L. REV. 226 (1938). Right of way cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription in Louisiana because servitudes, of passage are regarded by the Civil

Code as "discontinuous." Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 722 (1870).
170. See Bomar v. Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926) (dictum)
Town of Ruston v. Adams, 9 La. App. 618 (1929).
171. Landry v. Gulf Utilities Co., 166 La. 1069, 118 So. 142 (1928).
172. See Comment, The Effect of Dedication to Public Use in Louisiana, 13

TUL. L. REV. 606, 607, 610 (1939). But ci. Comment, Establishment and Termination of Public Rights in Roads and Streets in Louisiana, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 521, 523, n.7 (1956). See also Comment, Dedication of Land to Public Use,

16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 789 (1956) ; Robinson, Dedication of Streets and
Alleyways in Louisiana, 25 TUL. L. REV. 88 (1951).

173. See De Armas v. Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La. 132, 189 (1833)
(holding that the common law doctrine of dedication to public use was incompatible with the French and Spanish laws prevailing in Louisiana at the time
preceding statehood).
174. See Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 122 (1841)
(holding that the question of dedication was governed by the principles of City
of Cin(innati v. White's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832), a common law case,
and citing as authority the dissenting opinion in the De Armas case!).
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and civilian conceptions were gradually displaced by common law
rules.
The essential characteristic of common law dedication to
public use is the absence of requisite formalities. Though intention by the landowner to dedicate (frequently assimilated to

"offer"), and acceptance by the public are indispensable, 17 5 the
intention may be manifested by mere toleration of the public
use 1 76 and the acceptance by actual use by the public.
The nature of the public interest created in roads and streets
by an informal dedication has been a controversial subject in

Louisiana, and has given rise to conflicting judicial determinations. The earliest Louisiana case to present the issue was
Renthrop v. Bourg,17 decided in 1816. The Louisiana Supreme

Court citing Roman 7 8 and Spanish 79 authorities, held that the
title to public roads was vested in the public. However, dicta
in subsequent cases cast considerable doubt on that rule.

80

In

the meanwhile, the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 was enacted,
and Article 654 thereof provided that "the soil of public roads
belongs to the owners of the land on which they are made." 81'
Thus, when in 1848, in Hatch v. Arnault,'5 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court reconsidered the issue of title to public roads, its
conclusion was that the rule of Roman law vesting title in the
public could obtain only restricted application in Louisiana. In

the course of its opinion the court made the somewhat obscure
distinction between grande chemins (highways) which belong
175. See Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 989, 183
So. 229, 240 (1938) ; Town of Carrollton v. Jones, 7 La. Ann. 233 (1852) ; Livaudais v. Municipality No. 2, 16 La. 509 (1840) ; Jouett v. Keeney, 17 La. App.
323, 136 So. 175 (1931). Comment, 13 TUL. L. REV. 606, 610 (1939).
176. See Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 205 La. 988, 18 So.2d 591 (1944). Of.
Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870) ; Picket v. Broad, 18 La. Ann.
560 (1866) ; Saulet v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855) ; New Orleans and
Carrollton Ry. v. Town of Carrollton, 3 La. Ann. 282, 284 (1848) ; Cook v. City
of Opelousas, 4 La. App. 300 (1925). In addition to a finding of intention to
dedicate, implied dedication has sometimes been based on estoppel in pais. Ford
v. Shreveport, 204 La. 618, 16 So. 2d 127 (1943) ;Torres v. Falgoust, 37 La. Ann.
497 (1855) ; Saulet v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855).
177. 4 Mart.(O.S.) 97 (La. 1816).
178. D.43.8.2.21.
179. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 3.28.6. See also Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.)
19 (La. 1819) (dicta).
180. Of. De Armas v. Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La. 132 (1833).
181. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 654 (1825). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 658 (1870).
182. 3 La. Ann. 482 (1848). Deviation from the Roman rule was justified on
the ground that while Roman roads were constructed to be as permanent as man
could make them and were built on land previously acquired by the state, the
roads in the new and unsettled colony of Louisiana were of necessity temporary
and subject to change.
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to the nation, and chemins publics (public roads) which belong
to private owners. This distinction, however, was merely
academic since Louisiana roads were held to be generally
chemins publics, namely privately owned. Subsequent cases seem
to have obscured the issue, some of them holding that title to
the soil of public roads is vested in the public,1 8 3 and others that
title to the property is retained by the owners. 8 4 According to
the latter view, which is fully supported by Article 658 of the
Civil Code, and which is the prevailing one today, the public
acquires merely a servitude of passage on the land. 8 5 In an
effort at reconciliation and harmonization of these seemingly
inconsistent cases, a distinction has been urged between country
roads, on the one hand, and streets within the limits of municipalities, on the other. 1 6 Thus, in the case of roads the alleged
rule seems to be that title is retained by the former owner, while
in the case of streets title is vested in the public.187 Though the
distinction may find some support in the wording of the Code,1ss
no real policy ground may be seen for it. Perhaps these seemingly inconsistent adjudications may be reconciled merely by
reference to the particular issues involved, and on the basis of
controlling legislative texts enacted during the period. 89
183. See New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695
(1913); Kline v. Parish of Ascension, 33 La. Ann. 562 (1881); Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 630 (1877) ; Baton Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869) ;
Kemp v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934) ; Town of Napoleonville v. Boudreaux, 142 So. 874 (La. App. 1932).
184. James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So. 2d 858 (1947) ; Landry v. Gulf
States Utilities Co., 166 La. 1069, 118 So. 142 (1928); Collins v. Zander, 61
So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1952) ; Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940).
Shreveport v. Simon, 132 La. 69, 60 So. 795 (1912) ; Bradley v. Pharr, 45 La.
Ann. 426 (1893).
185. See Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So.
229 (1938). The notion that the public acquires ownership seems to remain applicable to lands other than roads or streets. See Comment, 16 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEW 789, 797 (1956) ; Locke v. Lester, 78 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 1955).
186. See Comment, 13 TUL. L. REv. 606, 611 (1939). The distinction is not
supported by the cases, and may lead to confusion. See Comment, 16 LOuISIANA
LAW REVIEW 521, 524, n.17 (1956). Of. Flory, Who Gets the Royalty on Unit
Production Allocated to Streets and Public Roads?, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
MINERAL LAW 51 (1955).

187. Cf. Jaenke v. Taylor, 160 La. 109, 117, 106 So. 711, 714 (1926) (the
owner "divested himself of the fee as completely as if he had made a direct sale
or donation of the said streets to the public").
188. Articles 454 and 458 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 mention "streets"
only and seem to refer to cities. Article 658, on the other hand, speaks only of
"public roads" and seems to refer to country roads as distinguished from city
streets. Both streets and roads, however, are clearly within the scope of Article
482, and "insusceptible" of private ownership while public use continues.
189. Cf. Wilkie v. Walmsley, 173 La. 141, 136 So. 296 (1931); Jaenke v.
Taylor, 160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1926) ; Town of Napoleonvile v. Boudreaux,
142 So. 874 (La. App. 1932).
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A common law dedication may terminate by formal revocation made by the proper authorities in accordance with statutory provisions,190 or by informal abandonment and non-use.
Abandonment may be express, based on a declaration that the
right-of-way has been abandoned, or implied, from many and
varying circumstances. In any case, abandonment must be based
on clear proof of intention on the part of the proper authorities
to abandon the road. Intention to abandon must be established
by the relocation of the road under the authority of the governing agency, and the maintenance of the relocated road.' 91 No
such intention was found, however, when relocation was made
in a haphazard way and without the authority of the proper
governing agency. 192 Non-use, and corresponding liberative prescription of ten years in accordance with Article 789 of the
Civil Code, may also be relevant in connection with termination
of a common law dedication. Thus, even in the absence of clear
proof as to intention on the part of the proper authorities to
abandon a road, non-use of a strip of land as a public road or
street for a period in excess of ten years may result in termination of the public use.9 3
According to the prevailing view, after termination of a common law dedication the title to the soil belongs in full ownership
94
to the original owner, since the "fee" was never alienated.
Louisiana Act 382 of 193815 provides that upon revocation of
dedication the soil of roads or streets "up to the center line...
shall revert to the then present owner or owners of the land
190. See LA. R.S. 48:701 (1950).
191. See Starnes v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish, 27 So. 2d 134 (La. App.
1946).
192. See Bordelon v. Heard, 33 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 1947) ; Starnes v. Police
Jury of Rapides Parish, 27 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 1946). See also Caz-Perk Realty,
Inc. v. Police Jury of Parish of East Baton Rouge, 207 La. 796, 22 So.2d 121
(1945) ;Jeffries v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish, 53 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 1951)
Young v. Hickman, 13 La. App. 173, 127 So. 659 (La. App. 1930).
193. Although Article XIX, § 16, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 states
that "prescription shall not run against the State in any civil matter," it is established that the constitutional prohibition does not apply to alienable municipal or
parish property. See New Orleans v. Salmen Brick and Lumber Co., 135 La. 828,
66 So. 237 (1914) (involving interpretation of the same constitutional prohibition
in Article 113 of the Louisiana Constitutions of 1898 and 1913). Cf. Paret v.
Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933); Jouett v.
Keeney, 17 La. App. 323, 136 So. 175 (La. App. 1931).
194. See Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So.
229 (1938) ; Mendez v. Dugart, 17 La. Ann. 171 (1865) ; Ayer v. Kirkwood, 9
La. App. 306, 308 (1928) (soil of the public roads belongs to owners of the land
on which they are made). Cf. Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 205 La. 988, 18 So. 2d
591 (1944) ; LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950).
195. See LA. R.S. 48:701 (1950). Cf. Robinson. Dedication of Streets and
Alleyways in Louisiana, 25 TuL. L. REV. 88, 89 (1950).
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contiguous thereto." This provision, however, was apparently
intended to apply to statutory rather than common law dedication. In the former case, the owner is divested of title and the
land may well be granted by the statute to the owners of the
contiguous land; but in the latter case, this solution would apparently conflict with constitutional provisions guaranteeing
property rights.
Louisiana Act 51 of 1930196 provides the procedures which
a landowner may follow to create a subdivision of a city or town,
and to dedicate its streets and alleyways to public use. The provisions of the act have been construed to be "directory," hence
in most instances substantial compliance with the requisite for197
There is no
malities will be sufficient for a valid dedication.
the public
by
acceptance
formal
requiring
act
the
in
provision
Furnecessary.
is
acceptance
such
no
that
and it has been held
the
by
use
actual
ther, in contrast to common law dedication,
recorupon
public is unnecessary; dedication becomes complete
dation of a map containing a description of the streets and alleyways dedicated. 198 The effect of formal dedication is to divest
99
the original owner of title and vest it in the municipality.
The act of dedication, however, may define the nature of the
public interest created, and title to the soil may be expressly
the public interest is confined merely to
reserved. In that case
20 0
the use of the street.
Formal dedication may terminate only by a formal act of
revocation. 20 ' Abandonment, and non-use by the public do not
have the same effect as in common law dedication. However,
formal revocation is ordinarily predicated on abandonment: if
the street is still needed by the public, the municipality does not
have authority to revoke the dedication. 20 2 The discretion of
196. See LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1950). See also id. 33:31.
197. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So.
229 (1938) ; Collins v. Zander, 61 So. 2d 897, 899 (La. App. 1952) ;Life v. Griffin, 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940) ; Sliman v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen, 145
So. 410 (La. App. 1933).
198. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229
(1938) ; Collins v. Zander, 61 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1952).
199. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 2d
229 (1938) ; Kamp v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934). Cf. LA.
R.S. 33:5051, 31 (1950).
200. See Jaenke v. Taylor, 160 La. 109, 117, 106 So. 711, 714 (1925).
201. See Robinson, Dedication of Streets and Alleyways in Louisiana, 25 TUL.
L. REV. 88 (1950).
202. See Caz-Perk Realty, Inc. v. Police Jury of Parish of East Baton Rouge,
207 La. 796, 22 So. 2d 121 (1945). Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1944-1945 Term - Property, 6 LoUISIANA LAW REVEW 554 (1946). See
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municipal authorities to revoke dedication of an abandoned street
is very broad, and there is a rebuttable presumption that revocation is proper.20 8 Judicial intervention is confined to cases in
which the action of the authorities appears to be fraudulent,
capricious, or arbitrary.2 04 In case of termination of formal
dedication by revocation, title to the soil is acquired by the
adjacent landowners in accordance with Act 382 of 1938.205
However, to affect interests of third parties, revocation must
20 6
be recorded.
PRIVATE THINGS
Things belonging to the "private domain" of the state or its
political subdivisions, and things belonging to private persons
may be given to public use by provision of law or private act of
dedication. 20 7 The Code regulates expressly only the public use
of the banks of navigable rivers. Though the ownership of such
banks is vested in the riparian landowners (Article 455, paragraph 2), "the use of the banks of navigable rivers or streams
is public" (Article 455, paragraph 1).208 The content of public
use is that "everyone has the right freely to bring his vessels
to land there, to make fast the same to trees which are there
also Police Jury, Parish of Jefferson v. Noble Drilling Corp., 232 La. 981, 95
So. 2d 627 (1957), holding that a police jury cannot revoke the dedication of a
park, since LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950) did not make provision for parks. La. Act
229 of 1958 filled this gap by authorizing revocation whenever the area in question is abandoned or no longer needed. Upon revocation, title reverts to the former
owner.
203. See Caz-Perk Realty, Inc. v. Police Jury of Parish of East Baton Rouge,
207 La. 796, 22 So. 2d 121 (1945) ; Young v. Hickman, 13 La. App. 173, 127 So.
659 (La. App. 1930).
204. See Jeffries v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish, 53 So. 2d 157 (La. App.
1951) ; La Rocca v. Dupepe, 97 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 1957).
205. See LA. R.S. 48:701 (1950); Robinson, Dedication of Streets and
Alleyways in Louisiana, 25 TUL. L. REV. 88, 90 (1950). In case the land in
question has been mortgaged or transferred, a conclusive presumption has been
established that the transfer or mortgage of land adjacent to an abandoned road
includes all the transferor's interest in the road, unless expressly excluded. LA.
R.S. 9:2981-2984 (Supp. 1958), added by La. Act 528 of 1958. See also id. 9:29712973, added by La. Act 555 of 1956.
206. See Matin v. Fuller, 214 La. 404, 37 So. 2d 851 (1948) ; The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term - Property, 10 LOUIsIANA LAW
REViEW 176 (1950).
207. Things enumerated in Articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code are by definition subject to public use. Thus, Article 453, § 2, declares that "it follows" from
the definition given that "every man has the right freely to fish in the rivers,
ports, roadsteads, and harbors." This is simply indicative of the fact that such
things are subject to public use; "fishing" is only one instance mentioned expressly. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 50 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 1951).
208. Cf. State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 342, 72 So. 984, 988 (1916) : "The
right of use of such property (i.e., the banks of a stream and the alluvion attached
to the riparian land) being vested in the public, its administration, for the purposes of that use, devolves upon the state, and is, ordinarily, committed to the
governing bodies of its various subdivisions."
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planted, to unload the vessels, to deposit his goods, to dry his
nets, and the like." The last clause makes it clear that the
enumeration is indicative rather than exclusive. Further, it is a
consequence of the public use that the riparian landowner is
forbidden to obstruct the bank or deter the exercise of the public
right, and that no compensation is due to him.
Article 456 of the Civil Code defines the word "banks." Thus,
according to the Code, "The banks of a river or stream are
understood to be that which contains it in its ordinary state of
high water; for the nature of the banks does not change, although for some cause they may be overflowed for a time." 20 9
Exception is made with regard to the banks of the Mississippi
and other navigable rivers where levees are constructed according to law. In such case, "the levees shall form the banks" (Article 457, paragraph 2).
Connected with the public use of the banks of navigable
rivers is the burden placed on riparian lands with regard to
construction and maintenance of levees. This burden may affect
not only riparian lands, but also adjacent lands, in accordance
with a broad discretion of the governing agency with jurisdiction over levees. 210 Originally, landowners were required to construct levees at their own expense. In the last part of the
nineteenth century, however, the Louisiana legislature established levee districts under the authority of levee boards authorized to build and maintain levees at public expense. 21 1 Further, while originally no compensation was due for taking lands
for the construction of levees, a constitutional amendment in
1921 provided for payment to be made for lands "actually used
or destroyed" by levee construction.2 1 2 The amount paid is the
assessed value of the land for the preceding year, or the actual
value if the latter is less than the former. 213 Title to the lands
209. But cf. Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 251, 90 So. 637, 638 (1922) ;
"The land lying between the edge of the water at its ordinary low stage and the
line which the edge of the water reaches at its ordinary high stage that is, the
called the
highest stage that it usually reaches at its ordinary high stage -is

Gauthreaux, 173 La. 737, 138 So. 650 (1932).
210. See Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F.2d 515 (D.C. La. 1930) ; Note, 21 TUL. L. REV.
649 (1947).
211. See Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership 16, WEST'S LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE, preceding art. 448 (1950).

212. See LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. This constitutional provision has been construed in a number of cases. See Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F.2d 515 (D.C. La. 1930) ;
Dickson v. Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District, 210 La. 121, 26

So. 2d 474 (1946) ; Mayer v. Board of Commissioners of Cadde Levee District,
177 La. 1119, 15) So. 295 (1933).
213. See Coloidal Land Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Potitlartrain Levee
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so used or destroyed remains in the riparian landowner, for the
lands are not "expropriated" for levee construction; the payment
2 14
is merely an indemnity for the public use of the lands.
COMMON THINGS
In addition to things of the public domain of the state and
its political subdivisions, and private things, "common things"
definition. This is true of
are also subject to public use -by
the air, the sea, running water, and the seashore. The reclassification affected by the Louisiana legislature and court action
whereby parts of the Gulf, running water, and the seashore were
declared to be state property rather than common things did not
215
circumscribe or restrict the public use of such things.
The Code contains detailed provisions only with regard to
the public use of the seashore. Article 452 enumerates a number
of rights vested in all. Such are the "right to build cabins thereon
for shelter, and likewise to land there, either to fish or shelter
himself from the storm, to moor ships, to dry nets, and the like,
provided that no damage arise from the same to the buildings
and erections made by the owners of the adjoining property."
This enumeration is, obviously, indicative rather than exclusive.
An amendment to the above article, made in 1914, added a further proviso that "the seashore of an incorporated city or town
...
shall be subject to the police power of such city or town...
and no cabins or other structures shall be built on such seashore
or in the waters adjacent thereto except upon such conditions
as the city or town may prescribe." This amendment does not
alter the character of the seashore within city limits, nor does
it result in conceptual differentiation between seashore within
city limits and seashore outside city limits. It merely stresses
the public interest in the use of seashore within city limits. Such
use, though available freely to all as before, is now subject to
regulation in the interest of all.
Nature of the Public Use
According to continental civilian conceptions, the dedication
of a thing to public use generates legal relations of a two-fold
nature. On the one hand, the relation of the state to the thing
is one of public law, and, on the other hand, the relation of priDistrict, 170 La. 1057, 129 So. 635 (1930). Of. Comment, 5 TUL. L. REv. 106
(1930).
214. See Ruch v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275, 9 So. 473 (1891).
215. Cf. text at notes 36, 60 8upra.
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vate persons to the thing is one of private law. 218 The content
of the public law relation consists in the authority of the state
("imperium") to administer and regulate the public use in the
interest of all. The content of the private law relation consists
in the use itself by all persons concerned. 217 The rights of those
making actual use of a thing dedicated to public use do not constitute a power over the thing itself; they are not regarded as
real rights, possession, or detention.2 1 8 One's right to public use
is merely regarded as an incident of a comprehensive right to
one's own personality. Accordingly, the right to public use enjoys the same protection accorded to the right of personality.
It may give birth to an action for damages in case of unwarranted interference; it is inalienable; it cannot be prescribed
against; and while public use continues, it cannot be lost by
resignation or non-use. 219 This complex theoretical construction
may be of considerable utility elsewhere but for several reasons
cannot be a useful guide for the development of Louisiana law.
In Louisiana, public use is generally regarded as a servitude
on land in the interest of the public. 220 While this conception
216. See BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 535 (1955) (in Greek) ;
I 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, LEHRHUCIH DE BItRGERLICIREN RECHTS 545, 550
(1949). In general, however, the nature of public use is a controversial matter.
3 DUGUIT, TRAITli DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 348 et seq. (1938) ; LEHMANN,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BeRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 370 (1957); 3 PLANIOL
ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 130 (1952).
217. See I 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, LEJIRBUCH DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS

Of.

552 (1949). Cf. LeBlanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 251, 70 So. 212, 215
(1916).
218. See BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 535 (1955) (in Greek)
I 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, LEHRBUCH DES BROERLICHEN RECHTS 553 (1949).
Louisiana courts have reached the same conclusion. See Keefe v. City of Monroe,
120 So. 102, 105 (La. App. 1929): "Mere physical possession of public places
which are not subject to private ownership is not such possession as entitles a
possessor to maintain himself against the public." See also Bruning v. New Or-

leans, 165 La. 511, 521, 115 So. 733 (1928).
219. See BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 536 (1955); I 1
ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, LEHRBUCH DES BIGRGERLICHEN RECHTS 553 (1949). In
Roman law, the public interest in the free use of things dedicated to public use
was controlling and generated the concept of usus publicus, namely a public right
protected by the Praetor. The inalienability of things subject to public use and
their insusceptibility of private ownership was the guaranty of the public right.

See 3 PIANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 126 (1952).
220. See Comments, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 789, 792 (1956) ; 12 TUL. L.
REV. 428, 431 (1938) ; Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership 15, in WEST'S
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE, preceding Art. 448 (1950). Cf. Pruyn v. Nelson Bros., 180
La. 760, 157 So. 585 (1934) ; State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916).
The servitude of public use, however, is a sui generis one. Cf. Lyons v. Hinckley,
12 La. Ann. 655 (1856). Accordingly, administrative authorities and courts have
broad powers in connection with the regulation and protection of the public use.
See LeBlanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 276, 70 So. 212, 223 (1916). In case
of conflict of interests, due to insufficiency of the thing subject to public use to
satisfy all needs, the authorities may define priorities and attendant limitations.
Cf. Comment, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 500, 507 (1956), in connection with the
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may not be fully compatible with traditional civilian notions
concerning servitudes, 221 it has several advantages, and if consistently followed, it could furnish an acceptable basis for the
solution of a number of legal problems. The rights of all concerned could be defined, regulated, and protected by applying
the code provisions relating to servitudes rather than restoring
to the common law rules of nuisance. 222 Further, in case of
termination of the public use due to natural or legal causes, and
the d~classement of the thing subject to public use, the involved
problem of title223 could find an easy solution: being no longer
burdened with a public servitude, the thing should return in full
ownership to its original owner, be it the state, its political subdivisions, or private persons.
In Louisiana, public use is not necessarily incompatible with
private rights over a thing subject to public use. It has been
already stated that private ownership may well co-exist with
dedication to public use. 224 Further, in certain cases, exclusive
private rights of use and exploitation may be accorded by the
authorities or reserved by the private owner upon dedication
of a thing to public use. 225 Such rights are, ordinarily, based on
a lease. The extent to which exclusive private rights may interfere with public use is ordinarily subject to judicial determination, though within the limits of a broad administrative discre26

tion.2

regulation of water rights. The public right to the free and unobstructed use of
things dedicated to public use may be protected by actions brought either by public
officers or private citizens. Schoeffner v. Dowling, 158 La. 706, 104 So. 624
(1925) ; Locke v. Lester, 78 So. 2d 14, 17 (La. App. 1955). Cf. Mayor v. Magnon,
4 Mart.(O.S.) 2, 10 (La. 1815). See also Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So.
812 (1928) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 50 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 1951).
221. Cf. 3 ENNEccEus-NIPPERDEY, LE]nRBUClI DES BOEGERLICHEN RECHTS
430 (1949); GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BGRGERLICHEN RECHTS 134 et seq.
(1959) ; HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES BYRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 242 et seq.
(1960). See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 647 (1870) : "A real or predial servitude
is a charge laid on an estate for the use and utility of another estate belonging to
another owner."
222. Of. Boyce Cottonseed Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Red
River, Atchafalaya and Bayou Boeuf Levee District, 160 La. 727, 107 So. 506
(1926) ; Lambert v. American Box Co., 144 La. 604, 81 So. 95 (1919) ; Mayor v.
Magnon, 4 Mart.(O.S.) 2 (La. 1815) ; Town of Amite City v. Southern United
Ice Co., 34 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 1948).
223. See text at notes 183, 194, 199 supra. Cf. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 971
providing that upon termination of the public use the thing in question ceases
being out of commerce. In that case, ownership is free of all restrictions; and if
the same thing belonged to the state, now is a part of the private domain.
224. Cf. text at notes 132-133 supra.
225. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 744 (1870) : "Servitudes may be established on
all things susceptible of ownership, even on the public domain, on the common
property of cities and other incorporated places." See also LA. R.S. 41:1211
et seq. (1950) ; LeBlanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212 (1916).
226. See Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. and G. Ry., 167 La. 771, 120 So. 290
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Exclusive private rights ("jura propria") on things subject
to public use, compatible with, and in most instances serving
the public interest, are termed by civilian doctrine "concessions.1 22

7

Concessions are regarded as unilateral acts of the

public authorities, even where they are based on a contract with
the recipient of the concession. Ordinarily, the content, duration,
and transferability of the rights created depend on the particular circumstances and on the terms of the official act itself.
These rights are in most instances regarded as servitudes, personal or predial. Except where the thing belongs to the state,
or is expropriated, consent by the owner is a prerequisite for
a valid concession. Another prerequisite is that the exclusive
2
private rights should not obstruct or deter the public use. 2

Concession is subject to revocation only if the official act so
provides. In the absence of other provisions, concession is regarded as establishing a real right, and revocation may be made
only in accordance with the law of eminent domain. This actually
distinguishes concession from a mere license by the authorities,
which is freely revocable.
THINGS SUSCEPTIBLE OF OWNERSHIP
According to Article 483 of the Civil Code, "Things susceptible of ownership, are all those which are held by individuals,
and which may be alienated by sale, exchange, donation, prescription, or otherwise. '' 22 9 The usefulness of this definition is

questionable. If susceptible of ownership were things "held by
individuals" ("held" meaning factual control), then anything
that could be held by individuals could become the object of
ownership. This, however, cannot be so since factual control
does not always lead to ownership. If "held" means "owned"
(the only rational hypothesis), then Article 483 tells us that
susceptible of ownership are things owned by individuals. This
(1929) (declaring city ordinance, subsequently converted into contract, null and
void as involving maintenance of structures encroaching on public use of street) ;

Anderson v. Thomas, 166 La. 512, 117 So. 573 (1928)

(municipality enjoined from

erecting building in city park which allegedly would encroach on public use). Of.
La Rocca v. Dupepe, 97 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 1957): "[I]t is well-settled that

courts will not interfere with the functions of police juries or other public bodies
in the exercise of the discretion vested in them unless such bodies abuse this
power by acting capriciously or arbitrarily."
227. See 3 PLANIOL ET RiPERT, TAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 150

(1952).
228. Id.

536 (1955)

at 151 et seq.

See also BALLIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW

(in Greek).

229. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE (1808)
art. 475 (1825).

(no corresponding article) ; LA. CIVL CODE
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is also a questionable circular statement. Susceptible of ownership, or rather more accurately, susceptible of private ownership
are not things "owned" at a given moment by individuals but
230
things which the law permits individuals to own.
Further susceptible of private ownership are not only things
owned "by individuals." Ownership by corporations, both private and public, is recognized by the Code ;231 and things owned
by such corporations are obviously susceptible of ownership.
Finally, susceptible of private ownership. are not only things
which "may be alienated." Indeed, there are things which though
inalienable, may still be susceptible of private ownership. 232 The
definition, therefore, of things susceptible of private ownership
in terms of their alienability is not correct.
Apparently, the intention of the redactors of the Civil Code
was to draft a provision corresponding to the preceding Article
482, which defined things not susceptible of private ownership.
Then, as susceptible of private ownership should be regarded
all things which are neither "common" nor "public" in the sense
of being part of the public domain. 233 Such are things which
according to law may be owned by private persons, individual
and corporations, and things belonging to the private domain
of the state and its political subdivisions.
Indeed, the Code distinguishes things susceptible of private
ownership into two categories: things which belong to private
persons and things which belong to the private domain of the
state. According to Article 459 of the Code, "Private estates
and fortunes are those which belong to individuals." 23 4 This
article simply means that things belonging to private persons,
whether individuals or corporations, are private things. Referring to the private domain Article 486 of the Code declares
that "The national domain, properly speaking, comprehends
all the landed estate of all the rights which belong to the na230. Cf. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246
(1918): "Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value" (dissenting
opinion by Justice Holmes) ; Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935). See also Sentel v. New Orleans
and C.R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897) (discretion of the Louisiana Legislature to recognize property rights in dogs); Harper v. Stanbrough, 2 La. Ann. 377 (1847)
(every government has the right to establish and regulate the rights of property
within its jurisdiction).
231. See LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 449, 484 (1870).
232. Cf. e.g., LA. CIVIL

CODE

art. 2357 (1870)

(dotal property).

233. Cf. text at notes 79, 80 supra.
234. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE, p. 96, art. 10 (1808); LA. CIvIL CODE art. 450
(1825).
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tion, whether the latter is in the actual enjoyment of the same,
or has only a right to reenter on them." 25 This is no more than
a general definition of property belonging to the private domain
of the state and, necessarily, must be supplemented by other
articles in the Code and by special statutes.3 6
The distinction between things belonging to private persons
and things of the private domain is important since different
rules may apply to each category of things. In that regard,
Article 484 of the Code declares that "Individuals have the free
disposal of the property which belongs to them, under the restriction [restrictions] established by law." Things of the private domain, on the other hand (the Code uses the expression
"property of corporations of cities or other corporations") are
"administered according to laws and regulations which are
peculiar to them, and can only be alienated in the manner and
under the restrictions prescribed in their several acts of incor23 7

poration."

Civilian scholars are not in agreement as to which things are
part of the private domain of the state.-3 In the light of the
legal situation in Louisiana,2 9 it may be stated that to the private domain clearly belong moneys accruing from taxes and
special assessments, revenues from enterprises whether of a
sovereign or non-sovereign nature, properties and rights granted
to the state, and buildings and lands which are not subject to
public use.2 40 Thus, unclaimed swamp land held by the state
under grant from the United States, 241 and the bottoms of non2 42
navigable waters in general are part of the private domain.
Problems are posed by certain statutes which asserted state
ownership over a number of things which according to the Code
were originally regarded as res nullius, namely, belonging to no
one. Statutory provisions, for example, declare that the state owns
235. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE, p. 100, art. 33 (1808); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 478
(1825). This article obviously reflects terminological difficulties encountered by

the redactors of the French Civil Code. Cf.
TION DES BIENS 320 (
) ; 3 PLANIOL ET

DEMOLOMBE, TRAITP DE LA DISTINCRIPERT, TRAITL PRATIQUE DE DROIT

124 (1952).
236. See, e.g., note 140 supra; notes 241, 242 infra.
237. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE, p. 100, art. 32 (1808); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 476
(1825).
238. Cf. text at note 74 supra.
239. Cf. text at note 78 supra.
240. Of. text at notes 84-85 supra.
241. Act of March 2, 1849, c. 87, 9 Stat. 352; Act of Sept. 28, 1850, c. 84, 9
Stat. 519. See also La. Acts 1862, No. 124.
242. See text at notes 140 et seq. supra. Cf. La. Acts 1910, No. 258.
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wild animals, fish, birds, alligators, salt water shrimp, oysters,
and crabs ;243 and it has been suggested that such things today
244
are part of the private domain of the state.
Perhaps, in civilian terminology, "ownership" as applied to
wildlife would be a misnomer. According to traditional notions,
ownership presupposes possession, and may be acquired only in
accordance with well-defined rules of civil law. Particularly
with regard to things already owned, transfer of title by the
owner, or acquisitive prescription is the rule. Thus, in the framework of traditional conceptions, state title to wildlife would make
impossible the acquisition of title by any captor, unless a fictitious tradition or prescription is resorted to. All this points to
the fact that state ownership of wildlife is a new conception, and,
in order to fit the traditional conceptual framework, new constructions and distinctions are necessary. In any case, sight
should not be lost of the fact that statutes asserting state ownership of wildlife are the result of an effort at conservation of natural resources in the interest of all, 245 and this predominant feature sets out the limits of state ownership. Thus, transfer of
title to any private person would be inconceivable. On the other
hand, conceptual difficulties apart, the magic of the word "ownership" may become apparent in the light of federal jurisprudence. Assertion of ownership by the state over wildlife may be
the guaranty of a more effective regulation. Indeed, attempts at
regulation of res nullius by state authorities in the past were
held in some cases to conflict with the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution. 246 Similar regulation of "state property"
would obviously be free of such objections.
CONCLUSIONS
The conceptual structure of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
Book II, Title I, has proved analytically deficient in certain instances. Perhaps, due to the fact that two distinct masses of materials were used- Roman sources and preparatory works of
the French Civil Code as well as that Code itself - the concepts
are sometimes blurred and a number of contradictions are present. In addition, subsequent legislative activity and case law
243. See La. Acts 1926, No. 273; 1932, No. 68; 1918, No. 83; 1926, No. 80;
1932, No. 50; 1932, No. 67; 1918, No. 104.
244. See Comment, The Public and the Private Domains of the State, 12 TuL.
L. REv. 428, 438 (1938).
245. Of. Pound, The End of Law, 27 HARV. L. REv. 195, 234 (1914).
246. CI. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
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altered the conceptual framework of the Code and made revision
imperative. Indeed, a persisting dichotomy between "law in the
books" and "living law" in Louisiana may be a disservice both to
society and to a venerable text. Respect for the law and our Civil
Code commands at this point an effort at establishing a clear
correspondence between legal precepts and rules in the Code and
in actual practice.
With the view to a possible legislative activity in that direction, the following observations may be of some value.
1. In contemporary continental systems, the primary distinction of things is between those in commerce and those out of
commerce. The distinction rests on the pragmatic consideration
that things in commerce are governed by the rules of civil law,
while things out of commerce are for the most part governed by
rules of public law, and only exceptionally and as to certain
issues by rules of civil law. Things out of commerce, though susceptible in certain cases of private ownership, are not susceptible of private relations incompatible with their destination;
private ownership, where possible, is limited by controlling considerations of public utility and convenience. Things out of commerce may be common things, certain public things, and things
subject to public use. Common things are the air and the waters
of the sea. Public things out of commerce are certain categories
of state property, excluded from the sphere of the civil law due
to controlling considerations of public utility. And things dedicated to public use, whether state or privately owned, are out of
commerce as a result of their dedication to public use. Things
in commerce may be defined as those which are fully susceptible
of private relations and private rights. These things are governed by the rules of the Civil Code, and may be owned by the
state or by private persons.
2. The distinction of things between those susceptible of private ownership and those not so susceptible is founded in the
Louisiana Civil Code, subsequent statutory legislation, the Louisiana Constitution, and case law. This distinction may be retained for systematic and historical reasons. Difficulties, however, will arise in connection with the definition of things which
belong to one or the other category. Insusceptible of private ownership are the common things and certain public things. These
common and public things may not be "owned" by any one, even
by the state. As to such things the rules of the civil law do not
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apply. Things susceptible of private ownership, on the other
hand, may be things in commerce or things out of commerce.
Things which, though susceptible of private ownership, are out
of commerce are things dedicated to public use. Things susceptible of private ownership may be owned by private persons, individuals and corporations, and by public corporations. Such
things are governed by the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.
3. The distinction of things into common, public, and private, though actually subsumed under the preceding two classifications, may also be retained for systematic and historical reasons. Redefinition of the concepts, however, is necessary. Common things are out of commerce and insusceptible of private
ownership by any one, including the state. Public things are, in
general, things belonging to the state and its political subdivisions. As such, they may be in or out of commerce, susceptible
of private ownership or not, and subject to public use or not.
Detailed regulation of each category of public things should be
made in specific statutes rather than the Civil Code which should
be confined to the regulation of private property. Finally, private things may be defined as those which according to law may
be owned by private persons, individuals, and corporations.
These things are by definition susceptible of private ownership,
though not necessarily in commerce.
4. The distinction between the public and the private domain, though supported by the Civil Code, has become almost
meaningless in practice. Yet, it could be reintroduced into our
law by a clear distinction between state property which is insusceptible of private ownership and out of commerce, and state
property which is both susceptible of private ownership and in
commerce. Thus, while property of the public domain would be
governed by rules of law other than those of the Civil Code,
property of the private domain would be subject to the same
rules of law governing property held by private perons.

